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This thesis describes the development of a Monte Carlo simulation to predict the dose
rates that will be encountered by a novel robotic inspection system for the pressure
tubes of an offline CANDU reactor. Simulations were performed using the Monte
Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) radiation transport code, version 6.1. The radiation fields
within the reactor, even when shut down, are very high, and can cause significant
damage to certain structural components and the electronics of the inspection system.
Given that the robotic system will rely heavily on electronics, it is important to know
the dose rates that will be encountered, in order to estimate the component lifetimes.
The MCNP simulation was developed and benchmarked against information obtained
from Ontario Power Generation and the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories. The bench-
marking showed a good match between the simulated values and the expected values.
This simulation, coupled with the accompanying user interface, represent a tool in
dose field prediction that is currently unavailable. Predicted dose rates for a postu-
lated inspection at 7 days after shutdown, with 2.5 cm of tungsten shielding around
the key components, would survive for approximately 7 hours in core. This is antici-
pated to be enough time to perform an inspection and shows that the use of this tool
can aid in designing the new inspection system.
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Nuclear power is one of the cleanest sources of electricity worldwide, and with more
than 435 commercial reactors operating in 31 countries it contributes approximately
11% of the worlds electricity [1]. Canada is a leader in the nuclear industry, and On-
tario specifically uses nuclear power to supply almost 60% of its electricity needs [2].
Figure 1.1 shows the different types of power generation used and their proportions
globally.
Figure 1.1: World Power Production (Modified from [1])
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Nuclear energy production is a growing and ever changing field where newer and safer
technology is always being developed and implemented. Canada is no exception, and
has been developing nuclear technology since 1941, becoming the second country in
the world to control a nuclear fission inside of a reactor (1945) [3]. Canada has also de-
veloped its own unique reactor design, the CANadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU)
reactor which is used in Canada, as well as being used in several countries world wide,
including Argentina, China, Korea, and Romania [3].
This chapter will discus some background on CANDU reactor design, different flaws
that the CANDU pressure tubes are susceptible to, their importance, and some of
the current inspection systems that are used to detect these flaws. Following this




There are several key features that distinguish the CANDU reactor from other re-
actors. The first of these features is the use of heavy water as both moderator and
coolant, as compared to PWRs and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), which are classi-
fied as Light Water Reactors (LWRs). Along with the use of heavy water, the CANDU
reactor uses natural uranium fuel. This is an important distinction as it means that
the uranium does not need to be enriched prior to being converted into UO2 fuel.
The third defining feature for the CANDU reactor is the use of multiple horizontal
pressure tubes, as opposed to a single, large pressure vessel found in LWRs. The
pressure tubes are where the fuel is loaded into and where the coolant passes through
to remove the heat from the fuel. These horizontal pressure tubes also allow for the
2
Figure 1.2: CANDU System Overview [5]
final defining feature of the CANDU reactor, the ability to refuel online. PWRs, and
BWRs both use a refuelling system known as batch refuelling, where the reactor is
shutdown and all of the fuel is removed at once and replaced with fresh fuel. The
downside of this refuelling method is the need to use burnable poisons to limit the
initial reactivity of the fresh fuel. CANDUs get around this issue by refuelling small
amounts, on a regular basis, while the reactor is still running. This means that the
fresh fuel being inserted can be compensated for by placing it in strategic locations
near older, burnt fuel, which serves to mitigate the local reactivity change. [4]
The main purpose of the CANDU reactor, and any commercial reactor, is to generate
electricity. This is done by using the heat generated during the fission process to
heat the coolant water. In the case of the CANDU reactor, with its heavy water
coolant, this hot coolant then passes through a heat exchanger, also called a steam
generator, which transfers the heat to a light water secondary side, as shown in Figure
1.2. This two side design has the benefit of reducing the likelihood of a radioactive
3
release to the environment because the light water, which becomes steam, was never
in the reactor and was not in contact with any radioactive material. The light water
on the secondary side is converted into steam and is then passed through a set of
turbines where it deposits most of its energy before going to a condenser and back to
the steam generator. The energy that was deposited into the turbines causes them to
spin, which is then used to turn a generator and create electricity. Figure 1.2 shows
the full system from reactor to electricity production. [4]
1.1.1.1 Main Reactor Components
As mentioned in the previous section, the CANDU reactor is unique in its design
and construction. The first difference is the fuel bundle. The CANDU fuel bundle
is very small relative to other reactors, approximately 50 cm long, 10 cm in diameter,
and 24 kg total mass [4]. The fuel bundle is composed of a number of fuel pencils
(elements), an end cap on both ends to hold the elements together, and bearing pads,
which are what contact the pressure tubes. Figure 1.3 shows a standard 37 element
fuel bundle, like what is used in modern CANDU reactors. CANDU reactors use
either a 12 or a 13 fuel bundle layout per channel, depending on the reactor [6].
Figure 1.3: CANDU Fuel Bundle [7]
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The fuel channel is what holds the fuel, as well as providing the pressure boundary for
the Primary Heat Transport (PHT) system. This pressure boundary is vital because
the CANDU reactor, unlike BWRs, keeps the moderator separate from the coolant.
In addition to this separation there is also a large difference in the pressure and tem-
perature which each system is kept at. The moderator system is kept at low pressures
and low temperatures. The coolant is kept at much higher pressure, approximately
11 MPa [4] in the pressure tube, and temperatures above 250 ◦C [4].
The components that make up this pressure boundary are the pressure tube and the
end fittings, and Figure 1.4 shows how these and other components are connected.
The pressure tube is where the fuel actually sits and on either end is an end fitting,
which houses the shield plug as well as the closure plug, which can be removed to
allow for online refuelling. The pressure tube is connected to the end fitting using a
rolled joint, where the pressure tube is forced out and into groves on the inside of the
end fitting lip.
In addition to the pressure tube there is also the calandria tube. The calandria tube
is located around the pressure tube, and is connected at either end to the shield wall
with a rolled joint similar to that used for the pressure tube. Between the pressure
tube and the calandria tube is a CO2 gap that acts as thermal insulation to separate
the high temperature pressure tube and coolant from the low temperature moderator.
In order to ensure that this gap between the tubes stays constant there are four garter
springs spread along the length of the pressure tube. It is very important that this
gap is maintained because if the pressure tube is allowed to come into contact with the
calandria tube the temperature gradient will cause reactions that can lead to Delayed
Hydride Cracking (DHC). This phenomenon will be discussed in further detail in





























These fuel channels are laid out into a lattice, with each channel being 28.6 cm, centre
to centre, from surrounding channels [4]. The number of channels that are laid out
is dependant on the exact reactor, however, for this work a 480 channel CANDU
was used. Specifically, the model has been based developed based on specifications
for the Darlington 934 MW CANDU reactor [9]. The space between the channels is
primarily taken up by moderator however there are also a number of control mech-
anisms threaded through the space. These control mechanisms include Liquid Zone
Controllers (LZC), adjusters, absorbers, and shut down rods, as well as the pipes
that distribute the liquid poison for Shut Down System (SDS)2. Around the entire
lattice is the calandria tank, which serves to contain the moderator. Finally, on either
end of the reactor are the shield walls. These shield walls consist of two large steel
plates with a central cavity filled with light water and carbon steel balls. The walls
have pass-throughs for the end fittings, and combined with the shield plugs serve to
provide biological shielding, thereby reducing the amount of radiation that escapes
the reactor. Figure 1.5 shows the full assembly of the CANDU 6 reactor, including a
cutaway to show the internal structures discussed in this section. [4, 6]
CANDU reactors rely on the pressure tubes to contain the fuel and to act as a pressure
boundary for the coolant and if one of these pressure tubes were to rupture it could
lead to a serious accident, known as a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA). LOCAs
are considered to be one of the most serious accident scenarios for CANDU reactors
and as such, regular inspection is necessary to ensure that the pressure tubes are
not at risk. The following section will explain some of the most common flaw types,
their development mechanisms, and their threats, followed by a section discussing the
current inspection systems used to monitor these flaws.
7
Figure 1.5: CANDU 6 Full Reactor Assembly [8]
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1.1.2 Flaw Types
There are three main flaw types that can threaten the integrity of CANDU pres-
sure tubes, potentially leading to a LOCA. These three types are fretting, DHC and
irradiation enhanced deformation. Each of these flaw types has a different mecha-
nism by which it operates and thereby each posses a different threat. The following
sub-sections will give a more detailed explanation of the three types of flaws.
1.1.2.1 Fretting
One of the most common flaws that is encountered is known as a fret mark. There
are two main kinds of fretting: Fuel Bundle Bearing Pad Frets (FBBPF), and de-
bris frets. FBBPF are caused by fuel bundles moving or vibrating, thereby causing
the bearing pads to rub against certain sections of the pressure tubes. FBBPF are
generally rectangular in shape, relatively shallow, and not a significant threat to the
pressure tube integrity. There are, however, some situations where this fretting can
be accelerated, thereby leading to a deeper and more serious fret. In reactors that
use a 13 fuel bundle layout, such as the Darlington reactor which this work focuses
on, the #13 bundle, which sits on the inlet rolled joint, can be caused to vibrate
more vigorously than other bundles due to the turbulence from the inlet flow. This
increased vibration can lead to accelerated fretting on or near the rolled joint. Ad-
ditionally, a phenomenon called Abnormal Fuel Support (AFS) can occur, where the
fuel is not evenly supported, causing certain bearing pads to have uneven pressure
with the pressure tube. This uneven pressure can lead to deep and extensive fretting
in the Burnish Mark (BM) or mid plane areas, as shown in Figure 1.6. Either of these
phenomenon can be a serious issue if not monitored and caught early. [6, 10]
The second type of fretting is known as debris fretting. This occurs when a piece of
debris, generally foreign material, gets caught somewhere and cuts into the pressure
9
Figure 1.6: Bundle 13 Fretting [10]
tube surface. The most common location for this is underneath a fuel bundle bearing
pad. As the fuel vibrates in the flow, it presses the debris into the pressure tube. The
debris can also cause damage during refueling movements, leading to long scratches.
The size and shape of frets vary greatly depending on the piece of debris and where it
gets caught. That being said, debris frets can be very deep and often have some sort
of undercut due to the random motion of the debris in the flow. This can make the
frets difficult to detect and potentially very dangerous, especially if there are sharp
corners in the fret which could lead to higher than normal stress concentrations. [6,10]
In addition to FBBPF and debris fretting, there are several other mechanisms that
create similar flaws. These include things like: refueling scratches, where a part of the
fuel bundle scratches the surface of the pressure tube during refuelling; manufacturing
flaws, which may be scratches and dents or may be other flaws; and crevice corrosion.
Crevice corrosion is the most significant of these other flaws, and can be as significant
as fretting. Crevice corrosion is caused when a localized boiling condition occurs
where the bearing pads contact the pressure tube, leading to increased concentrations
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of LiOH. The number and severity of these crevices within the pressure tube are
related to the temperature profile of the channel, and as such tend to cluster near
the outlet, where the temperature is highest. These crevices are generally shallow
and wide and seem to be self limiting in depth, and, as such, not a direct threat to
pressure tube integrity. [6, 10,11]
1.1.2.2 Delayed Hydride Cracking
DHC is a phenomenon that occurs in zirconium alloys such as those used in CANDU
pressure tubes. DHC is a sub-critical growth mechanism, and involves the develop-
ment of localized brittle hydride phases within the alloy structure. These localized
areas of brittleness, combined with the stress on the pressure tube lead to the for-
mation of a crack. Once the crack has begun, more hydride diffuses to the tip of
the crack until it reaches a critical condition, which is dependant on the stress being
applied. When this critical condition is reached, the stress causes the crack to grow,
as shown in Figure 1.7. [12]
Figure 1.7: Delayed Hydride Cracking Mechanism, Reproduced from [12]
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The growth rate of these cracks is highly dependant on the amount of hydrogen in
solution in the zirconium alloy. There is always some amount of hydrogen in the
zirconium alloy, however, the solubility limit is low. Hydrides can form using either
hydrogen, from manufacturing, or deuterium, picked up during reactor operation.
However, deuterium is only half as effective at forming hydrides as hydrogen is, and
as such twice as much is needed [12]. The hydride concentration in the alloy is re-
lated to hydrogen/deuterium concentration, and to temperature. Hydrides are always
present at room temperature, but do not form at high temperatures as easily. This
mean that at reactor operating temperatures, higher hydrogen/deuterium concentra-
tions are required for hydrides to form. As such, DHC can occur more easily when the
reactor is cold, given that hydrides require less hydrogen/deuterium. Regardless of
the temperature, sufficient localized hydride concentration and tensile stress is needed
for DHC to occur. [11, 12]
DHC is only a threat when there is hydrogen and deuterium present to form hydrides
and, as such, there has been a great deal of work put into minimizing the amount of
these elements in the pressure tubes. The amount of hydrogen present in the pressure
tubes, which is introduced as a byproduct of manufacturing, has been reduced from
original amounts of 5 to 25 ppm down to a maximum of 5 ppm. Deuterium ingress
rates are generally around 1 ppm per year (hydrogen equivalent) and as such this
decrease in the initial hydrogen increases the time needed to form hydrides by up
to 20 years. This means that as long as conditions which cause localized buildups
of hydrides are avoided, the pressure tubes should be safe throughout their 30 year
lifetime. [11,12]
There are a couple different locations where localized concentrations of hydrides can
become a problem. The first is when the pressure tube sags, due to either movement
12
of the garter springs or irradiation enhanced sag (as discussed in Section 1.1.2.3), and
comes in contact with the cooler calandria tube. This contact, and the cold spot it
makes on the pressure tube, can lead to the formation of a hydride blister. This is
especially dangerous because, unlike most failures of the pressure tube which allow for
Leak Before Break (LBB) detection methodology, hydride blisters can create a crack
part of the way through the pressure tube meaning that LBB may not occur. This
can happen when the garter springs move during construction of commissioning, and
while this should not be a problem with the tight garter springs used in the newer
reactors, inspections still attempt to localize the springs to be certain. The rolled
joint area of the pressure tube is also at an increased risk of DHC because of the
higher than normal deuterium ingress rates and higher tensile stresses. Finally, other
flaws in the pressure tube, including frets, scratches, crevice corrosion locations, and
any other surface flaw, can be locations where hydrides gather, leading to increased
DHC chances. [6, 11,12]
1.1.2.3 Irradiation Enhanced Deformation
Irradiation enhanced deformation is a phenomenon that affects the zirconium alloy
that makes up CANDU pressure tubes. Pressure tubes are near-constantly exposed
to high temperatures (∼300 ◦C), high pressure (∼11 MPa) and high neutron fluxes
(∼3.7× 1013 n/cm2/s) and fluences (∼3× 1022 n/cm2) [11], which lead to changes in
the material. The primary deformations that occur are: sag, elongation, diametral ex-
pansion, and wall thinning. Figure 1.8 shows most of these deformations as compared
to an original pressure tube. This section will discuss these different deformations, as
well as their impact on the reactor, in more detail. [6, 11]
Sag is the first form of irradiation enhanced deformation that will be discussed. Sag
can happen in two different ways; the first being when the pressure tube sags between
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Figure 1.8: Irradiation Enhanced Deformations of CANDU Pressure Tubes [11]
the garter springs, and the second is when the entire length of the pressure tube
sags. When the pressure tube sags between the garter springs it comes closer to the
calandria tube, and, as discussed in Section1.1.2.2, contact between these tubes is a
very serious issue which can lead to the formation of a hydride blister, and may lead
to a LOCA. This issue has been remedied in newer reactor designs by increasing the
number of garter springs from the original two up to four, and by using tighter fitting
springs that are much less likely to move. These improvements mean that there is
little to no chance of a contact occurring, even well past the 30 year design lifetime
of the pressure tubes. The second type of sag that occurs is over the full length of
the pressure tube, and in this case the calandria tube will sag with it. For most
channels this is not a concern however there are a number of pipes for SDS2 that
run horizontally at 90° to the pressure tubes. Channels above these pipes could come
into contact with the pipes, however this also should not occur in the design life. [6,11]
Over time, pressure tubes elongate as a result of the high temperature and fluxes that
they are exposed to. This elongation is linear in nature, with peak growth rates of
approximately 5 mm/year, and as such is easily predicted. This growth rate is how-
ever higher than the initial design expectations, and, as such, some early CANDUs,
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while having some features to accommodate this elongation, do not have sufficient
accommodations. All newer CANDUs includes several features which allow for this
elongation to occur without causing issues over the entire design life. With these ac-
commodations elongation does not present any serious concerns, however, inspections
are still done to ensure that the growth rate is normal. [6, 11]
Diametral expansion is another type of irradiation enhanced deformation that affects
CANDU pressure tubes. As the name implies, diametral expansion is the growth of
the overall diameter of the pressure tube. This can become an issue due to the in-
creased coolant flow that is allowed around the outside edge of the fuel bundles. When
coolant flow is allowed to flow around the edge of the fuel it decreases the amount that
flows through the bundle, thereby reducing the cooling that the centre fuel pencils
receive. This is remedied by slightly increasing the flow rate as the reactor ages. The
average growth rate for pressure tube diameter is around 0.1 mm/year, and is unlikely
to ever reach the conservatively set limit of 5% increase in the initial diameter. [6,11]
Diametral expansion can also lead to another side effect; wall thinning. As the diam-
eter of the pressure tube expands, the walls can begin to thin. This wall thinning is
well within the design expectations and as such this should not pose any significant
threat to reactor operation or lifetime. Regular inspection monitors the wall thickness
to ensure that there are no significant changes to the rate of thinning. [6, 11]
1.1.2.4 Flaw Interactions
As shown throughout this section, there are a number of different flaws that can occur
within the CANDU pressure tubes. While some of these flaws can pose a threat to
the pressure tube integrity, most have been designed for, and as such pose little to no
threat. While one flaw alone may not pose a severe threat, the combination of several
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Figure 1.9: CANDU Pressure Tube Failure Mechanisms, Adapted from [13]
key circumstances or multiple flaws can lead to a scenario where the pressure tube can
be compromised. The CANDU has an additional safety feature in this case, the LBB
system. This system detects any leak from pressure tube by constantly measuring
the CO2 annulus gas. This system means that if the pressure tube fails as it is meant
to, it will leak and can be detected. This failure mode is not guaranteed however,
and a Break Before Leak (BBL) failure can also occur. Figure 1.9 shows the failure
mechanisms discussed throughout Section 1.1.2 and how they interact with each other
to lead to a failure.
1.1.3 Inspection Systems
As discussed in Section 1.1.2, there are a number of different flaws that can occur in
CANDU pressure tubes, however, most of them have been designed for and are not a
threat to reactor safety as long as they are regularly inspected. These inspections are
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carried out during regular outages, meaning that the reactor is in an offline condition.
Being in an offline condition means that there will be a large amount of negative
reactivity in the reactor core from all of the shutdown mechanisms. This means
that any neutrons that are produced will have a very high chance of being absorbed,
therefor limiting the number of fissions that can be caused. This means that delayed
neutrons become the primary source of neutrons within the reactor, and after some
time cooling, even these delayed neutrons will decrease. This means that the neutron
flux is very low, low enough that it will be insignificant relative the amount of gamma
radiation for the purpose of causing damage. The channel being inspected is defueled,
and the shield plug is removed, leaving a the channel clear to be inspected by the
inspection system which would be installed in the end fitting. There are several
inspection systems that have been developed, as well as a number of custom built
systems made for one specific inspection. Below is a list of some of the inspection
systems that have been, or are currently used. [6, 11]
Dry Channel Gauging Equipment
An early inspection system that measured sag, pressure tube diameter and inside
tube profile.
Rolled Joint Ultrasonic Inspection Equipment
An early tool developed to inspect cracks in the rolled joint area.
STEM Inspection Delivery Equipment
An early eddy current and Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) inspection system.
Packaged Inspection ProbE (PIPE)
Designed to do fast ultrasonic inspections of rolled joint areas of pressure tubes,
at rates of up to 10 channels (20 joints) per day.
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Blister and Spacer Location Inspection with PIPE (BLIP)
Developed for the Pickering reactors in anticipation of the need to be able to
locate spacers, and detect hydride blisters.
Scrape Tool
A tool used to remove small slivers of pressure tube material which could be
tested to determine H/D ingress rates.
Spacer Location And Re-positioning (SLAR)
A tool designed to locate and, if need be, reposition garter springs for reactors
fitted with the loose garter spring design.
Flaw Replicator
A tool that makes a silicon/rubber mold of flaws, thereby allowing for 3D laser
scans to be made of the flaw using the Fret Replica Inspection Laser Scanner
(FRILS) system. This is done on relatively large, potentially dangerous flaws
found by other systems.
Channel Inspection and Gauging Apparatus for Reactors (CIGAR)
The CIGAR system is the currently used inspection system and is the main
focus of this research. Given the key role it plays in this research, Section 1.1.4
will examine it in depth.
1.1.4 CIGAR
The CIGAR system is very different from most of the other inspection systems, in
that it was designed to be a full channel inspection system. As opposed to tools
made to only scan one part of the fuel channel, such as the rolled joint, the CIGAR
does a volumetric inspection of the entire fuel channel. It does this with the use of
a multitude of different ultrasonic, eddy current and other sensors. The inspection
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Figure 1.10: CIGAR Inspection Head, Source: OPG
head can be seen in Figure 1.10. In addition to being able to scan the entire vol-
ume of the pressure tube, the CIGAR system can also measure the pressure tube
sag, gap between the pressure tube and calandria tube, and locate the garter springs.
An added benefit of the CIGAR system over some earlier systems is that it requires
minimal worker exposure due to the delivery system. It it this combination of diverse
detection equipment, full volumetric scan capability, and low worker exposure which
is why the CIGAR system is the primary inspection system used [11].
The CIGAR system is comprised of three main components: the inspection head,
the drive mechanism and the computer controls. The computer control and data
processing is done from a location outside of the containment building in order to
reduce dose to workers. The cables are run through pass-throughs in the containment
building, and into a local command node, before going to the drive mechanism and
on to the inspection head. The inspection head will be described in Section 1.1.4.1,
and the drive mechanism will be described in Section 1.1.4.2.
1.1.4.1 In-Core Inspection Head
The CIGAR inspection head is made up of a number of segments to allow for dis-
assembly. There are five main segments that make up the inspection head, and these
items can each be seen in Figure 1.11: the tailstock connector, labeled as HCR; the
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Figure 1.11: CIGAR Inspection Head with Labeled Components [6]
universal joint, also called a constant velocity joint; a centering module; sag mod-
ule; another centering module; and the ultrasonic module. The tailstock connector
is what attaches the inspection head to the drive rod, which will be discussed in
further detail in Section 1.1.4.2. The universal joint, often refereed to simply as the
U joint or CV joint, allows for the rotation from the drive rod to be passed smoothly
to the inspection head regardless of tilt or centerline offset. The centering modules
use spring loaded roller wheels to reduce the amount of friction on the pressure tube,
thereby reducing the chance of damage occurring, by allowing the robot to rotate
smoothly. Between the two centering modules is the sag module, where the sag sen-
sors are stored. In addition to the sag sensors, the eddy current coil for garter spring
detection is also mounted on this module, specifically around the outside. Finally is
the sensor head, where a number of different ultrasonic sensors are held, in various
arrangements. There are some newer models of the CIGAR inspection head which
include an improved gap sensor between the rollers of the front centering module. [6,11]
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Figure 1.12: CIGAR Ultrasonic Flaw Cluster [6]
The inspection head uses a number of different sensors to complete the full inspection,
including: ultrasonic sensors, in various arrangements; eddy current coils; and a servo
inclinometer, for sag measurement. The servo inclinometer takes sag profile measure-
ments every 30 mm along the inspection which allows for an accurate representation
of the sag within the pressure tube to be developed. There are two different eddy
current coils that are used, the garter spring location coil, and the gap module, which
is not shown. The garter spring module is primarily used on older reactors that are
still using the loose spacers, however, attempts have been made to extend this use
to tight spacers as well. The gap module, which is located between the rollers of the
front centering module also uses eddy current to determine the space between the
pressure tube and calandria tube. [6, 11,14]
There are a number of different ultrasonic sensors, arranged in different orientations,
all located within the ultrasonic module. The main set of ultrasonic sensors is referred
to as the flaw cluster, and is shown in Figure 1.12 (the central set of five sensors)
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along with some of the other ultrasonic sensors. This flaw cluster consists of four
10 MHz ultrasonic sensors, arranged in an angled configuration, along with a 20 MHz
sensor, normal to the pressure tube surface. The four 10 MHz sensors work in pairs,
one pair measuring circumferentially and one measuring axially, and, combined with
the normal beam, are what perform the volumetric inspection, detecting any flaws
above 0.15 mm deep. In addition to the flaw cluster, there is also a 10 MHz sensor
mounted normal to the pressure tube, mounted 40 mm in front of the flaw cluster.
This detector is what measures the diameter, as well as the wall thickness of the
pressure tube. [6, 11,14]
1.1.4.2 Drive Mechanism
The CIGAR head is driven through the pressure tube using a set of drive rods con-
nected to an external drive unit. This method of driving means that there must be
a way for the drive rods to pass through where the closure plug should be, and as
such, requires the use of a modified closure plug. The drive system, or Universal Drive
Machine (UDM), is either mounted to the fueling machine bridge or is delivered by a
crane and can reach any given channel. The UDM is connected to the inspection head
by the drive rods. These drive rods connect to the tailstock connector and serve to
both drive the inspection head, both axially and rotationally, and to house the data
transfer wires. There are two of these drive rods, a short rod and a long rod. These
rods lock to the inspection head, and combined these allow for the entire pressure
tube length to be inspected. As mentioned, these rods also carry the signals from the
inspection head to the local console, where it is then sent to the command station.
These signals are carried on a number of coaxial cables that are housed in the centre
of the drive rods. These cables are connected to a slip ring at the UDM to ensure
that they do not get tangled by the rotational drive. [6]
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Figure 1.13: Darlington Normal Closure
Plug
Figure 1.14: Darlington Modified Clo-
sure Plug
As noted earlier, the normal closure plug cannot be used due to the need for the drive
rods to pass through, and as such a modified closure plug is used. These modified
closure plugs vary depending on which reactor is being inspected, due to the different
closure plug mechanisms used. Figure 1.13 and Figure 1.14 show the normal and mod-
ified closure plugs for the Darlignton reactor, respectively. As mentioned in Section
1.1.3, the reactor is offline and cooled, however, there is still fuel in the reactor and as
such coolant must be kept flowing. Reduced coolant temperatures and pressures are
used during inspections, around 50 ◦C and 262 kPa [15]. Due to this reduced pressure,
the modified closure plug is sufficient to maintain the pressure boundary. This can
become an issue though, if pressure needs to be increased for any reason, such as to
maintain cooling. In these scenarios the drive mechanism is disconnected and the
fueling machines are brought in to form the pressure boundary on the channel being
inspected. [6]
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1.1.5 Robotics in Radiation Environments
Robots are an essential component in many nuclear environments, allowing workers
to do inspections or work in places where the radiation would normally prevent it.
Beyond the inspection systems that have already been discussed there are a number
of other applications for robotics in radiation environments. These applications range
from robots to perform inspections after a nuclear accident, such as at the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant, to gantry systems used in spent fuel storage facilities.
This section will examine some of the other robots that are being used in radiation
environments.
1.1.5.1 Fukushima Daiichi Post-Accident Inspection
In the wake of the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 2011
a number of radiation hardened robots have been sent into the destroyed reactor
building in an attempt to locate the fuel rods, which have likely fallen to the bottom
of the reactor vessel. On April 10, 2015, a robotic inspection system was inserted
through a small pipe in order to look for access to the basement of the reactor building,
such that an aquatic robot could then be sent to look for the fuel rods. The robot
found the basement access was clear and continued its inspection before eventually
getting stuck. During the inspection dose rates ranging from 7.4 Sv/hr to 9.7 Sv/hr
were reported. While this dose rate is extremely dangerous to humans, with the LD50
being approximately 4 Sv, these dose rates are reasonably low for inspection devices,
provided they are designed for the environment and use hardened components. [16]
1.1.5.2 Three Mile Island Post Accident Inspection
In the same way that inspections were performed at Fukushima Daiichi after the
accident, so to were inspections performed after the Three Mile Island accident in
1979. The difference between these inspections however is key. Where Fukushima
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Daiichi had very limited access due to the structural damage of the building, Three
Mile Island did not suffer the same damage, and as such, larger robots could be used.
A number of robotic inspection systems were used to do various tasks, in various
locations within the reactor building. The robots ranged from tracked inspection
robots with cameras to large robots with arms capable of lifting 450 kg. One such
inspection task was to monitor the demineralizer tank as the resins were flushed.
The robot that performed this task was outfitted with radiation hardened electronics,
including a live feed camera, and was receiving doses of 3.000 rad/hr (30 Gy/hr). [17]
1.1.5.3 Cleaning Steam Generators
Another application where robots have been used to limit worker exposure is for
cleaning the steam generators at nuclear reactors. Cleaning and inspection of steam
generators is done to ensure safety and to improve efficiency. Several robots have been
designed for this application, and are outfitted with high pressure water jets to clean
sludge which builds up. This sludge is radioactive and the steam generator has dose
rates ranging from 50 mSv/hr to 250 mSv/hr. [18]
1.1.5.4 Gantry Crane for Handling Used Fuel Casks
Another common task for robots that involves radioactive environments is the moving
of used fuel. This used fuel is generally stored in dry storage casks which help to
limit the radiation fields around it. One such example is the work done by Sandia
National Laboratories in which they analyzed the lifetime expectancy of such a gantry
system. The proposed gantry system would be used in an interim storage facility that
would house spent nuclear fuel while a disposal facility was prepared. Modeling was
performed to estimate the dose to the robotic system and potential failures that could
occur. The dose was found to be approximately 8 krad[Si] (80 Gy[Si]) per loading,
resulting in a dose of 1.6 Mrad[Si] (16 kGy[Si]) per year assuming 200 loadings per
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year. Another potential use of this same gantry system would be for decommissioning
and decontamination of reactors. Simulations showed that the dose for this application
would be approximately 35 rad[Si]/hr. Through these simulations, and a number of
tests to determine the radiation hardness of limiting components, it was found that
unless hardened components were used, the system would fail in less that one loading
for the used fuel application. [19]
1.1.5.5 Spent Fuel Storage Inspection
Spent nuclear fuel is often stored in concrete casks until it can be permanently dis-
posed of. These casks need to occasionally be inspected to ensure that they are still
structurally sound and that no major cracking has occurred, especially near the end
of their design life. These inspections are performed by a robotic inspection system
equipped with a radiation hardened video camera. Dose rates within these casks vary,
both based on the location within the cask and with time, but can exceed 2.000 R/hr
(17.5 Gy/hr[Air]). [20]
1.1.5.6 Used Fuel Reprocessing
Used nuclear fuel can be stored, and eventually disposed of, or it can be reprocessed,
taking the usable material out of it to use again. This reprocessing has high dose
rates and even higher contamination rates and, as such, is done with extensive use
of robots. Different fuel compositions result in different dose rates, however, it is not
uncommon to have dose rates as high as 103 Gy/hr during the dismantling process
and up to as high as 104 Gy/hr during vitrification of waste materials. [18]
1.1.5.7 Inspection of PWRs
CANDU reactors are not the only reactors that use robotic inspection systems, how-
ever, the geometries and amount of shielding present is very different between a
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CANDU reactor and a PWR. One notable example of an emergency inspection of
a PWR was at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station when a fuel assembly was
unable to be removed during a planned refueling. Robotic inspection and repair de-
vices were key in the safe repair and removal of this fuel assembly, especially given
that dose rates as high as 5.000 R/hr (43.9 Gy/hr) were noted. [21]
1.1.5.8 Summary
In summary, there are a wide array of robotic systems which operate in radiation
environments. These environments all have different difficulties, including radiation
field strength. The CANDU inspection environment is unique though in the expected
dose rates associated with having fuel so close to the inspection systems are signifi-
cantly higher than other radiation inspection environments. It is for this reason that
it is so important to be able to accurately simulate this environment and ensure that
any proposed inspection system will be able to survive.
1.2 Problem Statement
As shown in Section 1.1.4.2, if the coolant pressure needs to be increased for any
reason, it will require the fueling machines to be used to form a pressure barrier,
as the modified closure plugs are incapable of withstanding operating level pressure.
Additionally, the UDM requires the use of the fueling machine bridge, further limiting
the possibility for other work to be done at the reactor face at the same time. These
limitations limit inspections to being done one at a time. These inspections are very
time consuming, taking up to 12 hours per channel, thereby requiring long outages.
Minimizing the length of reactor shutdowns is exceedingly important given the large
costs associated with lost revenues due to the reactors not producing electricity. With
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this in mind, it is clearly desirable to reduce inspection times in order to reduce reactor
downtime. One method to reduce these inspection times would be to develop a system
that would be capable of inspecting multiple channels simultaneously. Such a system
would need to be self contained and autonomous in its inspections, as well as having
a system of ensuring the pressure boundary is maintained regardless of circumstances.
1.2.1 Improved Inspection System
The design of such an inspection system is being undertaken by a large, interdis-
ciplinary team of researchers at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology’s
Mechatronic and Robotic Systems (MARS) Laboratory. This inspection system will
be capable of performing any inspection that the current CIGAR system can. In
addition, the improved system shall include some form of channel closure that will
be capable of withstanding the full operating pressure of 11 MPa [4], plus a safety
margin. This will ensure that increasing coolant pressure will not require the use of
the fueling machines to maintain the pressure boundary, thereby allowing inspections
of multiple channels to be undertaken simultaneously via the use of multiple copies
of the new inspection system.
The improved inspection system will have the following key features:
• Use the existing CIGAR inspection head
• Be able to perform any inspection the current system can
• Be fully contained within the end fitting once installed
• Include a full pressure closure plug
• Not require the use of the fueling machine bridge once installed
• Include fail safe recovery options
• Allow for multiple copies to simultaneously inspect different channels
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This improved inspection system will undoubtedly have significantly more, and more
sensitive, electronics within the reactor. This use of more electronics will result in
a greater affect of radiation on the components used in the inspection system, and
could lead to shortened lifetime of the inspection system. This thesis represents the
investigation and analysis of the dose rate and expected doses to the offline pressure
tube inspection system that is being developed. In addition, potential radiation effects
to critical components of such a system will be considered. These radiation effects,
coupled with the dose rate estimations will allow for prediction of potential failure
times for the key components within the new inspection system.
Currently there is no data or tool available for mapping or accurately predicting the
radiation fields within the reactor as a function of location. This thesis will examine
the development of a simulated reactor environment and Graphical User Interface
(GUI) to allow for predictions of these dose fields to be done without the need for
specially trained personnel.
1.2.2 Objectives
The objectives of this work are as follows.
• To develop a Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) model of the radiation environ-
ment within an offline CANDU reactor.
• To estimate the dose rates and total dose that an inspection system is likely to
encounter while inspecting an offline CANDU reactor.
• To benchmark the MCNP model against industry values.
• To develop a simple and rapid Graphical User Interface (GUI) that will allow
users to generate and run the necessary MCNP simulations, without requiring
specialized knowledge of MCNP.
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1.3 Scope
The scope of this work is to build an offline MCNP model of the Darlington CANDU
reactor. This model will simulate the inside of the reactor channel, however, it will
not be able to estimate dose on the reactor face. Additionally, this model will only
simulate gamma radiation because, as mentioned in section 1.1.3, the amount of neu-
tron radiation present in the offline state will be very low. The improved inspection
system that is being developed as part of the over arching research is not part of
this thesis, and while it may be discussed for context, no part of its design is being
presented as finished work here.
The original scope of this work included the possibility of online inspections and the
comparison of simulated dose rates to measured reactor face dose. However, it was
quickly determined that online inspections would not be possible due to the high dose
rates. It was also found that the dose rates at the reactor face are almost exclusively
due to activation products, and not from fuel dose within the core. It is for these




Radiation comes in many forms and energies, but regardless of the type of radiation
or the energy, there is the potential for it to cause damage. Different types of radia-
tion cause damage in different ways, and there are four main categories or radiation:
photons, including gamma rays, x-rays, and bremsstrahlung; electrons, such as beta
emissions; heavy charged particles, such as alpha particles, protons and other heavy
ions; and finally, neutrons. As stated in Section 1.3 this work is only concerned with
gamma radiation. This is because the reactor is in a shutdown state, and as such,
limited neutrons will be present. In addition, both heavy charged particles and elec-
trons have very short ranges, especially through denser materials, such as water and
metals, and as such, none of these particles would be able to reach the area of interest.
Given that this work is only considering gamma radiation, this chapter will focus on
the effects caused by photons.
There are two main categories when in comes to radiation effects: the effect of radi-
ation on passive components, such as metals, polymers, lubricants and other passive
materials; and the radiation effects to active components, such as electronics. Elec-
tronics are generally much more sensitive to radiation than passive components are,
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and even if the damage occurs when the electronics are not in use, it can still impact
the active operation. Each of these categories will be discussed in a separate section
below. However, before the effects on materials can be discussed, the mechanism by
which radiation interacts with materials must be mentioned.
2.1 Radiation Interaction With Materials
2.1.1 Neutron Interactions
Neutrons are the obvious starting point for this analysis as they are central to nuclear
fission. That being said, given that this work focuses on offline reactors where neutrons
are not present in large quantities, most neutron interactions will not be covered.
Neutrons interact with the nucleus of the atom and can cause a number of changes
to the atom. Generally speaking, the neutron is absorbed by the nucleus, following
which several different things can occur depending on the atom. The results of the
neutron absorption can range from the neutron being ejected at a different angle after
depositing some of its energy (called a scatter), to the neutron causing the atom to
break into smaller pieces (called fission). In addition, if the neutron stays in the atom
after it is absorbed it will cause the atom to become a different isotope. This isotopic
change can lead to changes in material properties, as well as possibly changing the
atom to a radioactive isotope. These are some of the reasons that inspections are
done while the reactor is shut down.
2.1.2 Gamma Interactions
In the offline reactor there are still large amounts of radiation present, however, it is
in the form of alpha, beta or gamma radiation. Both alpha and beta radiation have
short ranges, especially in denser materials such as metal and water. For this reason
the specific interactions of alpha and beta radiation will not be discussed. Photons
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Figure 2.1: Photon Cross Section in Iron for Different Interactions [22]
such as gamma rays on the other hand, can penetrate deep into materials, even very
dense materials. This makes photons the primary threat to materials and electronics
used within the reactor.
Photons are classified as ionizing radiation, meaning that they interact with the elec-
trons that surround the nuclei, as opposed to neutrons which interact with the nucleus.
This means that when a photon interacts, provided that it has sufficient energy, it
will knock electrons out of their orbit, leaving the atom as an ion. This process is
called ionization. Photon radiation can interact in one of three ways depending of
the energy of the photon, and the attenuation factor of the material, as shown in
Figure 2.1. The three interactions that can occur are: photoelectric effect, Compton
scattering, and pair production.
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2.1.2.1 Photoelectric Effect
Photoelectric effect is when a photon strikes an orbital electron with sufficient energy
to knock it from its orbit. The photon is absorbed in this process, transferring all
of its energy to the electron. The electron then flies off with energy equal to the
incident photon, minus the binding energy of the orbit. This process dominates at
lower photon energies, and leads to the creation of free electrons. [23,24]
2.1.2.2 Compton Scattering
Compton scattering is a process that can occur at almost any energy, but is dominant
at intermediate energies. Compton scattering occurs when a photon hits an electron
and is scattered off at an angle, knocking the electron from its orbit in the process.
The angle that the electron is released at is relative to the angle that the photon is
scattered at and, additionally, the energy of both the electron and the photon are
functions of the angle of scatter. [23,24]
2.1.2.3 Pair Production
Pair production occurs when the photon energy is above 1.022 MeV, and involves the
generation of an electron-positron pair. This process is a direct conversion of energy
into matter, and has a threshold energy of 1.022 MeV because this is the rest mass of
two electrons (0.511 MeV). If the energy of the photon is higher than the threshold,
the excess energy is split between the electron and positron pair. The electron and
positron fly in opposite directions, and after a short distance the positron will come
in contact with an electron, resulting in the annihilation of the electron and positron,
and the release of two 0.511 MeV photons in the process. [23,24]
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2.1.2.4 Secondary Electrons
The electrons generated from any of these interactions can cause additional ionization
damage and will eventually come to rest somewhere else in the material. Ionizing ra-
diation can be especially damaging to molecules that are held together with covalent
bonds, as the removal of a bonding electron leads to the breakage of molecular bonds.
This breakage causes the disintegration of the existing molecule, and the formation of
new molecules, as discussed below. Additionally, ionizing radiation can be very dam-
aging to electronics where both the free electrons, and the ions can cause problems.
This will also be examined further later in this chapter. [25,26]
2.2 Passive Components
Passive components make up a large part of any robot, accounting for any structural
component and many other key pieces of the system. Different groups of materials
behave differently, and as such, this section has been subdivided into material groups,
for ease of understanding.
2.2.1 Metals
The first, and often most common, passive component material that will be discussed
are metals. Metals have a fairly unique atomic structure where the atoms are held in
a crystal lattice, surrounded by the electrons. These electrons are not attached to any
particular atom and can move freely. This free movement means that when a gamma
ray ionizes an electron from a metal, another electron can flow in to fill the gap. The
displaced electron will come to rest elsewhere in the material, and the steady state of
the metal is renewed. This ability of electrons to move freely within metals makes all
metals highly resistant to damage caused by ionisation. [25]
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2.2.2 Polymers
Polymers, including plastic, are materials comprised of long chains of molecules. These
long chains are very susceptible to damage from ionizing radiation, given that these
long chains of molecules are what give the polymer its properties. When ionizing radi-
ation interacts with a polymer it causes the bonds of these chains to be broken. Once
these bonds are broken several different outcomes may occur, as outlined below. [25]
The shorter chains may stay that way, resulting in a softer and weaker polymer, po-
tentially even causing the polymer to liquefy. Teflon, Plexiglas, and Lucite are all
examples of polymers that behave this way. [25]
Alternatively, these small chains could attach to other chains, either at the ends
thereby creating longer chains, or in the middle, leading to cross linking. Cross liking
is when two separate chains are joined mid-way through the chain by a smaller seg-
ment. This results in the polymer becoming more rigid and brittle, and is common
in polyethylene, polystyrene, silicon, and neoprene. [25]
Different polymers can tolerate differing amounts of radiation before damage begins
to occur. Mylar, for example, can tolerate 3× 104 MGy before any significant damage
sets in. Teflon on the other had can only tolerate 100 MGy to reach the same level of
damage. Figure 2.2 shows the radiation hardness of some common polymers. [25]
2.2.3 Rubbers
Rubbers, more generally refereed to as elastomers, are materials that are made of long
chains of atoms, not to be confused with polymers, which are chains of molecules. The
properties of elastomers are highly dependant on a balance between the freedom of the
chains, allowing for motion and thereby stretch, and the degree of cross linking, giving
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Figure 2.2: Effects of Radiation on Various Polymers (Modified from [25])
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structural integrity and strength. The degradation mechanisms for rubbers are almost
identical to that of polymers, where breakage, and potential cross linking, of the chains
can lead to either softer and weaker material, or harder and more brittle material,
depending on the composition of the rubber. Butyl rubber, for example, will soften,
whereas natural rubber will become hard and brittle. Different rubbers have different
radiation hardness, however, natural rubber is more resistant to radiation damage
than the synthetic variety. As shown in Figure 2.2 natural rubber can withstand
approximately 1× 103 MGy before any significant damage occurs. [25]
2.3 Effects on Electronics
Electronics are a major component of any robotic system, and as such, the radiation
effects are key to consider. Unlike the passive components discussed in Section 2.2,
electronics are active components. This means that they are regularly actively receiv-
ing and processing data, often in the form of voltage signals, and this data can often
be influenced by radiation interactions, or by the damage left from radiation interac-
tions. This makes electronics potentially much more susceptible to radiation damage
than passive components and often makes them the limiting factor in a robotic system
lifetime. [19]
The mechanisms by which radiation damages electronics is very complicated and,
while important to this work, is not the focus of this project. As such, an overview of
radiation effects on electronics has been included, but further details have been left
out. For further information on the specifics of these radiation effects to electronics,
please see [27–29], or the Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC)
short course notes, many of which contain a great deal of information on this field.
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This section will briefly address the main types of radiation events that are consid-
ered for electronics. Radiation effects in electronics can be divided into one of these
categories: Total Ionizing Dose (TID), neutron fluence effects, and Single Event Phe-
nomena (SEP) [19].
2.3.1 Total Ionizing Dose
As stated in [19], TID is the primary driver for radiation damage to electronics for
most robotic systems. It is a measure of the total amount of ionizing dose that the
electronics have received, regardless of the source. This means that even low energy
beta particles can have a significant effect, provided the total dose is sufficient.
As discussed in Section 2.1, when ionizing radiation, be it photons or secondary elec-
trons, interacts with material, electrons are ejected, producing free electrons and ions.
When this occurs in electronics both the free electrons and the ions, called holes, can
cause damage. Electron-hole pairs are generated along the path of the incident parti-
cle. Some of these electron-hole pairs will recombine, resulting in no damage, however
the fraction of electron-hole pairs that does recombine is a complicated function of
the material, incident radiation, and the electric field that is applied. Experimental
values are used to predict the number of electron-hole pairs that are generated and
survive recombination. For SiO2 it has been found that it takes '17 eV to produce
one electron-hole pair. [26]
Following the generation and recombination of these electron-hole pairs, the free elec-
trons are swept away by the electric field, and are collected within picoseconds. The
holes meanwhile, cannot actually move, as they are held in place in a lattice. However
the random movement of the bound electrons fills one hole while generating another
at a different location. Through this random electron movement the holes are able to
“move” without the atoms changing location within the lattice. When the holes arrive
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at the SiO2/Si interface a certain percentage are trapped. This trapped percentage
can vary from over 50 % in commercial devices, to below 5 % in specially radiation
hardened devices. These trapped holes will anneal over time by combining with excess
electrons, thereby neutralizing the damage. [26]
These holes, that are trapped at the SiO2/Si interface, are often referred to as interface
traps. The buildup of these interface traps is a time dependant effect because, as
mentioned previously, the holes cannot move freely and must instead rely on the
random movements of bound electrons to make their way to the interference layer.
These traps affect electronics primarily by changing voltages. This is most apparent
in Metal-Oxide-Semiconductors (MOS) circuits, due to their reliance on threshold
voltages. MOS circuits use a high/low voltage to change the switch from on to off, or
vice versa, depending on the type. This means that MOS circuits are susceptible to
these traps due to the change in the threshold voltage. Large concentrations of these
traps can even lead to the MOS circuit being rendered useless if the voltage threshold
shift is large enough to prevent the switch from changing states, thereby leaving it
either permanently on or off. Additionally, damage to the electronics can occur at
the time of radiation interaction, with the electron-hole pairs causing photocurrents
and space charge effects. [26]
2.3.2 Other Damage Mechanics
In addition to TID there are two main types of radiation damage that can occur:
Neutron damage and SEP. Neutron damage, as the name implies, requires neutrons
to occur and SEP require high energy charged particles to occur. Given that neither
of these are present in the case scenario being addressed by this model, the descrip-
tions of these events is being included for completeness sake, and will not be overly
detailed. [19]
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Neutron damage is based on the principles of displacement damage. Due to the neutral
charge of the neutrons, they interact with the atoms, unlike gammas which interact
with the electrons. This interaction with the atoms held in the crystal lattice can lead
to a wide array of damages. Most of these damage mechanisms begin when a neutron
hits an atom and deposits enough energy to knock it out of its lattice location. This
displacement leaves a vacancy in the lattice and when the atom comes to rest further
into the material it can either fill en existing hole, or become an interstitial atom.
Lattice vacancies and interstitial atoms disturb the uniform nature of the lattice, and
can change a number of properties, which can lead to device failure for electronics. [19]
Displacement damage requires a certain neutron fluence to accumulate before the
damage becomes significant. The fluence required varies depending on the damage in-
duced and the electronics that are being damaged, however, fluences of 1× 1012 n/cm2
to 1× 1015 n/cm2 are generally required as minimums before damage begins to accu-
mulate [27,28,30,31].
The final damage mechanisms are SEP, which occurs when a single, high energy par-
ticle strikes electronics. Generally, these high energy particles are only a threat to
space electronics, where fast moving charged particles are present, and as such this
will not be a threat to the electronics in the scenario being considered. SEP can be
broken down into two main types: strikes that result in soft errors, called Single Event
Upsets (SEUs); and those that result in hard errors, such as latch-up and burnout
events. Soft errors are considered those that can be corrected and do not cause per-
manent damage. Hard errors are those that cause some form of permanent damage
to the electronics. [32]
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When a high energy charged particle passes through material it loses energy by ion-
izing atoms along its path. Unlike with photons, which only ionize some of the ma-
terial, high energy charged particles ionize so much that they cause a dense plasma
of electron-hole pairs to be generated along the path. The electron hole pairs act as
described in Section 2.3.1 but there are many more of them. Additionally, the plasma
itself can cause damage. Soft errors are generally caused by the pulse of electricity
generated from the electron hole pairs, and can be dealt with pragmatically. That
being said, if these errors occur too frequently it can overwhelm the error handling
architecture and still lead to damage. Hard errors on the other hand generally form
as a result of the plasma generation. This plasma can cause shortcuts through gates
to be generated, and the heat generated from this can be sufficient to melt key com-
ponents, referred to as burnout. Alternatively, if the burnout does not destroy the
device, but instead connects certain components that are designed to be separated,
the switch can be rendered useless due to the short circuit caused by the plasma hole.
This is referred to as latch-up. There are other damages and effects that SEP can
cause, however, these are the primary ones and, as stated earlier, this is not a threat
in this scenario.
2.3.3 Radiation Hardness
Given that TID is the primary cause of damage to the electronics in the environment
that this work is focused on, it is reasonable to assess the electronics on the grounds of
a failure dose. This value, usually referred to as the radiation hardness, represents the
dose at which the electronics will cease functioning properly. This does not mean that
the electronics will function perfectly and then suddenly stop working, it is actually
when the electronics are likely to stop producing reliable results. This means that
while the electronics may continue to work past their maximum dose, they are not
likely to function well, and will be more likely to have issues. For reliability reasons,
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these manufacturer radiation hardness values are often treated as a hard maximum
dose, and the electronics are replaced before they reach this dose. Table 2.1 shows the
radiation hardness for some components which are likely to be included in the final
robotic design. These values for radiation hardness will be used later in Chapter 5 to
compare against predicted doses, and will allow for the estimated robot lifetime to be
determined.
Table 2.1: Radiation Hardness of Various Robotic Components
Type Component Total Dose
Computing
Integrated Circuit (CMOS) [33] 10 kGy[Si]
Microprocessor [33] 3 kGy[Si]
RAM [33] 10 kGy[Si]
A/D Converter [33] 10 kGy[Si]
Bus Interface [33] 3 kGy[Si]
SERializer/DESerializer [33] 10 kGy[Si]
Location
Sensors
Optical Encoder (Standard) [34] 1 kGy
Optical Encoder (Hardened) [34] 1 MGy
Optical Encoder (Fibre) [34] 10 MGy
Resolver [34] 10 MGy
Potentiometer [34] 10 MGy
Sensors
Ultrasonic Sensor [34] 10 MGy
Distance Sensor [35] 20 MGy
Other
Components
Conductors/Connectors [35] 10 MGy
Drive Mechanisms [35] 10 MGy
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Chapter 3
Monte Carlo N-Particle Simulation
MCNP was selected to be used as the Monte Carlo simulation code that would be used
for this work. There are a number of other Monte Carlo simulation codes available,
each with there own benefits and specialties. MCNP was selected as the best for this
work because it is a well verified software [36] and is an industry standard in North
America.
According to the Monte Carlo Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) [37],
MCNP “is a general purpose three dimensional simulation tool that transports 37
different particle types for criticality, shielding, dosimetry, detector response, and
many other applications.” To put this another way, MCNP is a radiation transport
code that uses the Monte Carlo method to simulate the transportation of multiple
types of radiation, at different energies, through a material. This chapter will explain
the basics of the Monte Carlo method, as well as some specifics on MCNP before
explaining the model that was developed.
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3.1 Monte Carlo Method
The Monte Carlo method is a stochastic modeling method that uses random numbers
to simulate real world scenarios. Monte Carlo methods are often used to simulate the
transportation of radiation through a medium, given the random nature with which
radiation behaves. In this case, the Monte Carlo method consists of simulating a fi-
nite number of particle tracks, known as histories, through the use of pseudo-random
numbers, as it is transported through a material.
In each history, random numbers are generated and sampled from Probability Density
Functions (PDFs) in order to simulate the movement of the particle. The random
numbers are used to generate many different traits of the particle including: initial
position, initial energy, direction of travel, track length, etc. These traits can be
treated as random variables which take on certain values with a frequency determined
by the PDF. The PDF represents the likelihood that the random variable, x, will take
a value between two bounds, a and b, as [38]:




The PDF will need to be normalized, depending on the bounds of the random variable.




f(x)dx = 1 (3.2)




f(x)dx = 1 (3.3)
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In addition to the PDF, there is also the cumulative probability distribution function.
The cumulative probability distribution [38]:
F (x) = P{x′ ≤ x} (3.4)
is the probability that a random variable x′ will take on a value equal to, or less than
x. Given the definition of f(x), it is known that the random variable can only take
on real values.
This limitation, coupled with the definition of the probability distribution shown in





It can clearly be seen from Equation (3.5) that the following are also true [38]:
lim
x→∞
≡ F (∞) = 1 (3.6)
lim
x→−∞
≡ F (−∞) = 0 (3.7)
As noted earlier, Monte Carlo calculations rely on random numbers. True random
numbers are not achievable in computer calculations and, as such, pseudo-random
numbers are used. These pseudo-random numbers, ξ, are uniformly distributed such
that [38]:
0 < ξ ≤ 1 (3.8)
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Given this distribution, ξ can be used to sample F (x) by [38]:
F (x) = ξ (3.9)
This gives an unbiased sample of F (x), however, it is the distribution of x that is
of interest. This can be found by performing an inversion of the function after each
random number is generated. This allows x to be sampled by [38]:
x = F (ξ)−1 (3.10)
By performing this inversion any random variable that has a cumulative probability
distribution defining the physical phenomenon can be sampled. This process is key to
the Monte Carlo method but can be difficult to perform depending on the complexity
of the PDF and the cumulative probability density. There are three methods by
which this inversion can be done: direct inversion, acceptance/rejection method, and
discrete data. [38]
3.1.1 Direct Inversion
Direct inversion is the ideal method to sample x but is often too complex to be fea-
sible, if it is even possible. There are, however, some simple inversions, such as the
distance between collisions, that can be directly inverted. Direct inversion will be
demonstrated here using the example of calculating the distance a particle travels
between collisions. [38]
To calculate the distance between collisions, measured in mean free paths, as described
by 0 ≤ x ≤ ∞, the PDF is [38]:
f(x) = e−µx (3.11)
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These equations are a mathematical representation of the physical phenomenon. The
PDF represents the probability that a collision will occur within the range of x to
x+dx, and the cumulative density function represents the probability that a collision
will occur within distance x. Due to the simplicity of this equation, a direct inversion





Using this inverted equation, ξ can be subbed into Equation (3.13) and x can be
directly calculated.
3.1.2 Acceptance/Rejection
The direct inversion is the ideal inversion method, however, there are many times
where this is too complicated. When this is the case, it is often beneficial to use
the acceptance/rejection method. For any random function it can be defined that
0 ≤ x ≤ a and that 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ fmax. Using this, x′ and f̃(x′) can be defined, such









In order to sample the distribution of x′, and by extension the distribution of x, two
random numbers, ξ1 and ξ2, are generated, evenly distributed between 0 and 1. This
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Figure 3.1: Acceptance/Rejection Method
allows for x′ to be set as x′ = ξ1 and then check if ξ2 ≤ f̃(ξ1). If this is found to be
true then the pair is accepted, otherwise it is rejected. As shown on Figure 3.1, this
can be visualized as checking if the point (ξ1, ξ2) falls underneath the curve formed
by f̃(x′). If it is under the curve it is accepted, otherwise it is rejected. [38]
This method is very useful for cases where F (ξ)−1 is hard to find because the inversion
can be completed without finding this. However, this method is ineffective when the
area under the curve f̃(x′) is small compared to unity. This is because most random
number pairs will fall outside of the curve and will be rejected. [38]
3.1.3 Discrete Data
In Monte Carlo methods, it is common that PDFs are given in the form of numerical
data from a histogram, which represents physically measured values, as seen in Figure
3.2a. As can be seen from Figure 3.2b, the cumulative probability distribution is a




[(x− xi−1)Fi + (xi − x)fi−1] (3.16)
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Figure 3.2: (a) Probability Density Function and (b) Cumulative Probability Distri-





fi′(xi′ − xi′−1) (3.17)
From here it is possible to indirectly determine x = F (ξ)−1. First, the interval of
the cumulative probability density function that ξ is in is determined, such that
Fi−1 ≤ ξ ≤ Fi. From this, F (x) is set equal to ξ in Equation (3.16), and then is
solved as [38]:
x =
(xi − xi−1)ξ − xiFi−1 + xi−1Fi
Fi − Fi−1
(3.18)
Discrete sampling is also used for times when a value of x is not needed, but instead,
an answer to a question is needed, such as “What type of collision has occurred?”
This is done by dividing the cross section (σ) for each individual interaction by the
total cross section. These cross sections represent the probability that the specific
interaction occurs. This means that the total range of all of the fractions together is
from 0 to 1. Using this, if each ratio is set to have a specific range, a random number
ξ can be generated and compared to the ranges for the interaction types. Whichever
range ξ falls within is the interaction that occurs. [38]
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3.2 MCNP Codes
MCNP6.1 [37] is the most recent version of MCNP, and is what has been used for
this work. Before MCNP6.1 there were two separate MCNP codes, each with unique
functionality [37]. MCNP5 [39] was the core MCNP code and is able to deal with a
wide energy range of neutrons, photons, and electrons. In addition to shielding and
dosimetry type calculations, MCNP5 is also capable of performing criticality calcula-
tions, including the capability of determine the keff eigenvalues.
Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) [40] was designed to offer several ex-
tended options that are not available in MCNP5. These extensions include, but are
not limited to, the ability to simulate the transportation of over 30 different particles,
extended energy ranges, and several improvements to the physics models.
MCNP6.1 [37] represents a combination of the core MCNP5 with the extended func-
tionality of MCNPX. MCNP6.1 is more than just a merger however, and includes a
number of new developments and improvements. MCNP6.1 is now capable of simu-
lating 37 different particles at a wide range of energies. These energy ranges, which
are particle dependant, are shown in Figure 3.3, along with some of the proposed
extensions. The area of interest for this work has been circled for clarity.
3.2.1 MCNP Input
Regardless of which MCNP code is used the basic input structure is very similar.
Users provide an input file, referred to as an input deck, that must contain certain
cards, or lines of code, in a specific order. This naming convention of decks and cards
goes back to early computing, when MCNP, which is built on a FORTRAN engine,
used punch cards as input. [39]
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Figure 3.3: MCNP6 Energy Ranges
MCNP is capable of simulating almost any situation, however, it requires the user
to provide an input deck to describe the specific situation to simulate. Each MCNP
input deck must contain specific blocks of data, and must appear in a very specific
order, as follows [39]:
Title Card The title of the project, will be ignored by MCNP.
Cell Cards Uses the surface cards and Boolean math to build cells.
<Must be separated with a blank line>
Surface Cards Define surfaces using basic shapes (i.e. sphere, planes, etc.)
or by using macro-bodies (a pre-made shape, such as a box).
<Must be separated with a blank line>
Data Cards Contains information such as source declaration, tally declara-
tion, materials, number of particles, and more.
<Recommended to add a blank line>
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It is key that the input is entered in the correct format, and without the use of control
characters, such a “tabs”, because a failure to do so will result in the simulation
crashing. In addition, aside from the blank lines to separate the different sections,
there cannot be any other blank lines. Once the input deck has been created, the
code is called from a command prompt and the input files are specified. Output file
names can be specified, otherwise default names are used. [39]
3.2.2 Verification Cases
Before the model of the reactor was developed several simplified cases were run using
MCNP to ensure that the results were acceptable. Several simple shielding arrange-
ments were set up and simulated in MCNP and MicroShield, a deterministic, point
kernel modeling software, as well as being compared to hand calculations. The test
cases included comparing calculation of gamma constants, simple shielding arrange-
ments, and a simplified CANDU fuel channel. All of these tests came back with
matching results thereby showing that MCNP was able to accurately model particles
in the energy ranges of interest.
3.3 Model
As discussed in Section 1.3, the reactor that is being modeled in MCNP for this sim-
ulation is the Darlington CANDU reactor. The Darlington reactor is a 480 channel
CANDU reactor. This section will discuss the major components within the MCNP
model and explain their interactions. Figure 3.4 shows a 3D rendering of the com-
pleted reactor model. In order to build this model, many dimensions were needed.
Many of these dimensions came from Ontario Power Generation (OPG) in the form of
technical drawings [41]. Please see Appendix A for a table outlining the drawings used.
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Figure 3.4: Full Reactor Model
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This section will describe each of the individual components of the model, as well
as how they interact with each other. Throughout the section will be a number of
figures extracted from VISED [42], a visual editor for MCNP, which has been used
to confirm geometries and to produce graphic representations of the model. These
figures are automatically coloured according to material, and the colours will be used
to reference specific components within the figures.
3.3.1 Fuel Bundle
The first component of the model that will be discussed is the fuel bundle. The fuel
bundle used in the Darlington reactor, and thus in the model, is a 37 element bundle.
This bundle, as discussed in Section 1.1.1.1, consists of 37 individual elements, or
fuel pencils, held together with two end plates. Each fuel element would consist of a
sheath, made from zirconium alloy, and a number of fuel pellets. For this model the
pellets have been simplified to one continuous piece, and the end plates, which hold
the elements in the right configuration have been ignored. Neither of these changes
should make significant difference as the amount of material present has not changed
significantly, nor has the configuration of shielding changed.
Figure 3.5 shows a 3D rendering of the fuel bundle as it appears in the MCNP model.
In addition to the fuel and sheathing, the D2O coolant volume around the fuel is
also modeled. The coolant is set to take up any location not already occupied by the
fuel bundle, and is left intentionally larger than needed in order to be cropped to the
appropriate size by the containing assembly.
3.3.2 Fuel Channel Assembly
The next component is the fuel channel assembly, composed of the fuel string, pres-
sure tube, annulus gap, calandria tube, and the surrounding moderator. The fuel
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Figure 3.5: 3D Rendering of MCNP Model of CANDU Fuel Bundle
bundle, which was discussed in the previous section, is put into an lattice, and re-
peated a total of 13 times. This fuel string lattice is bounded by the Zircalloy-2.5Nb
pressure tube, which cuts the lattice to the proper dimensions, and ignores anything
outside of the pressure tube inner surface. Around the pressure tube is the Zircalloy-
2 calandria tube, with a CO2 annulus gas filling the space between. A large area
of D2O moderator is then placed around the calandria tube. This excess moderator,
like the excess coolant around the fuel, will later be bounded by the lattice parameters.
Figure 3.6 shows a cut through of this assembly, with all of the individual components
visible. The fuel elements can be seen in the centre (dark blue) with the fuel sheath
(barely visible) and coolant (green) around it. Around that is the pressure tube (light
blue), the CO2 annulus gas (yellow) and the calandria tube (blue). Some of the
moderator (green) can also be seen, however, the moderator extends much further.
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Figure 3.6: Fuel Channel Assembly
3.3.3 Side Structural Components
At either end of the fuel channel assembly is a number of Side Structural Components
(SSCs), including the end fittings, closure plugs, shield plugs, and shield walls. The
following subsections will describe each of these components separately.
3.3.3.1 End Fitting
The first of these SSCs that will be discussed is the end fitting. The end fitting is a
large structure, which attaches to the fuel channel assembly at either end. The end
fitting is where the feeder pipes attach, allowing for the coolant to be circulated. Ad-
ditionally, the end fitting allows for the fueling machine to attach and form a pressure
boundary, thereby allowing online refueling, by removing the closure plug from the
end fitting. In addition to the closure plug, the end fitting also houses the shield plug.
This shield plug will be discussed further in the next section. The final component in
the end fitting assembly is the liner tube, which provides a channel for the incoming
coolant to flow through, and allows the fuel bundles to pass through the end fitting
and into the pressure tube.
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Figure 3.7: Section View of the End Fitting
Figure 3.7 shows the end fitting, as well as two section views of important parts. In
this figure, the end fitting can be seen (yellow), along with the shield plug. The closure
plug can also be seen at the end of the end fitting, however, it is worth noting that for
simplicity sake, the closure plug has not been modeled as a separate component, but
instead as a part of the end fitting. The first section view shows where the pressure
tube (blue) joins into the end fitting. This joint is the rolled joint as discussed in
Section 1.1.1.1. The second section view shows the liner tube, which is difficult to
see in the full view. It is also worth noting that while some simplifying assumptions
have been made to the dimensions and shape of the end fitting assembly in order to
allow for modeling, these simplifications preserved the thickness and the total volume
of the material and will not have an affect on the dose.
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3.3.3.2 Shield Plug
The shield plug is a large piece of stainless steel which acts as a biological shield, in
conjunction with the shield wall. The shield plug is located within the end fitting and
is held in place by a set of locking jaws which interact with corresponding mechanisms
on the inner surface of the end fitting. While the shield plug does provide shielding,
it also serves two other functions.
The first of these other functions is to hold the fuel string in place. With one shield
plug on either side, the space between the plugs is set such that it holds the fuel string
in place, thereby preventing it from moving axially. This is important because any
small movement of the fuel can lead to significant changes to the overall reactor power
distribution, and can even lead to transients.
The second function of the shield plug is to direct and smooth the flow of the coolant
as it enters the channel. As mentioned in the last section, coolant enters the end
fitting and travels along the annulus between the end fitting and the liner tube. Near
the end of this annulus the liner tube has a number of holes in it, which lines up
with a set of openings, or flow channels, in the shield plug. Figure 3.8 shows a 3D
rendering of the shield plug and these flow channels can clearly be seen. These flow
channels lead to the fuel channel and function to direct and smooth the bulk of the
coolant flow. Figure 3.9 shows several section views of the shield plug in order to
better illustrate these flow holes. Note that there are several different designs for the
flow smoothing portion of the shield plug, as well as small differences between the
inlet and outlet shield plugs, but for simplicity sake, a single, somewhat simplified,
shield plug was used in this model.
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Figure 3.8: 3D Rendering of the Shield Plug
Figure 3.9: Section View of the Shield Plug
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3.3.3.3 Shield Wall
The shield wall is the primary biological shield that prevents radiation of any kind
from coming out of the core. This is especially important when the reactor is in
shutdown and work is being done at the reactor face. The shield wall has four main
components: the Calandria Side Tube Sheet (CSTS), the Fueling machine Side Tube
Sheet (FSTS), lattice tubes, and the shield fill. The CSTS and FSTS are thick slabs
of stainless steel, approximately 5.1 cm, and 7.6 cm thick, respectively. These tube
sheets have a number of holes in them, one for each channel, and the lattice tubes
stretch between the two tube sheets, creating a void between them. This void is filled
with carbon steel shot balls and light water, in a 60:40 ratio [43], which acts as the
primary shield against both neutron and gamma radiation. The tube sheets and liner
tube also form the ends of the annulus gas system. The CSTS has a rolled joint
attaching the calandria tube to it, creating an enclosed volume for the moderator
on one side, and the annulus on the other. This annulus continues through the gap
between the end fitting and liner tube.
Figure 3.10 shows the major components of the shield wall in a section view of an
empty fuel channel. The two tube sheets (yellow) can clearly be seen at either end,
both above and below the end fitting (yellow). The liner tube (yellow) is more difficult
to see, due to its thickness, but it can be seen between the two tube sheets. The carbon
steel shot and light water has been homogenized into a single uniform material, with
the appropriate properties, and can be seen between the tube sheets (orange). Figure
3.11 shows how the shield wall fits in with multiple channels. It is also worth noting
that the shield plug, inside of the end fitting, completes the shield. In the 13 bundle
arrangement, which Darlington uses, half of each end bundle protrudes part way into
the end fitting, and consequently into the shield wall, as seen in Figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.10: Shield Wall Single Channel Close-Up
Figure 3.11: Shield Wall with Multiple Channels
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3.3.4 Lattice
The previous sections have described the fuel string, fuel channel, and various SSCs,
however, this only forms one of the 480 channels in the reactor. In order to create the
full reactor, there are two options: individually define all of the channels and com-
ponents, or use a repeated structures lattice. Defining all of the channels would be
impossible due to the number of surfaces required and the limited number of surfaces
able to be used. It is for this reason that MCNP has a repeated structures lattice
function.
A single complete channel is modeled and then placed into a lattice cell, and repeated
a number of times. The complete channel is made up of the fuel channel assembly,
with the fuel string inside, an end fitting on either end of that, with the shield plug
inside, and a section of shield wall that extends beyond the lattice cell. The shield
wall, moderator, and air around the end fitting all extend well beyond the size of
the lattice cell. This is done so that the lattice cell will cut these materials to size,
guaranteeing that all locations have the proper material properties. A lattice cell
is set up using the lattice pitch of the CANDU reactor, 28.6 cm [4], as the y and z
dimensions, and the entire length of the assembled components as the x dimension.
This allows multiple channels to be placed side by side, and ensure that the space
between channels is correct. Using this lattice cell as a basis, a repeated structures
lattice is set up and the single lattice is repeated 479 times. Figure 3.12 shows a 3 by
3 section of the lattice that was made.
MCNP requires a completely filled square lattice for these structures, however the
CANDU reactor has a circular shape. To deal with this issue, a separate lattice cell
was defined which consisted of moderator in the centre, with a shield wall section on
either side, and air beyond that. What this did was extend the existing geometries that
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Figure 3.12: 3x3 Lattice
continue beyond the outermost channel, but without adding more channels. These
separate lattice cells extend the geometries well beyond what they need to because
they will be trimmed to size by being bounded by the outer components, in the same
way the coolant around the fuel was bounded.
3.3.5 Outer Components
The last components in the reactor model are the outer reactor components, includ-
ing: the reflector volume, calandria tank, and several bounding surfaces. The first
component is a bounding surface that cuts the excess empty cells in the lattice, as
discussed in the previous section, to the proper shape and size. Around this surface is
the reflector volume, a large volume of heavy water moderator with no channels, that
acts as a shield and to reflect neutrons back into the core during operation. Around
that is the calandria tank, which holds the moderator. In addition to these compo-
nents around the core section of the reactor, there is also additional extensions to the
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Figure 3.13: Full Reactor Core Section View
Figure 3.14: Full Reactor Side View
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shield wall, allowing it to meet up with the calandria tank, thereby, forming a closed
volume. Finally, the air around the end fittings was extended to match the calandria
tank, giving one large cylinder for the entire model. Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show the
full reactor geometry including all of the internal components.
MCNP requires that there be an ultimate end in every direction. This is accomplished
by setting everything outside of the cylinder that makes up the model to be a complete
vacuum, called void, and setting the importance of any particle which enters this space
to zero. An importance of zero on a particle tells MCNP to ignore it from then on,
and thereby deletes the particle. In this way it can be set that any particle which
happens to reach the outside of the reactor is deleted, given that they no longer affect
the simulation.
3.3.6 Source Term
The source term is arguably the most important part of the reactor model, as it is
what describes the radiation that is being simulated. In an offline reactor there are
two main sources of radiation: the fuel and the activated reactor components. A
source term describing the activated reactor components was developed and tested.
However, due to a lack of input data, the results produced could not be made to ac-
curately match benchmark data [44]. Given this, an alternative method of adding the
activation dose was selected, which will be discussed in this section. The simulation
of the activated components was moved to a future work goal. Appendix B discusses
the activated reactor components model that was developed, as well as the results
produced.
As discussed in Section 1.1.1.1, the fuel in the CANDU reactor is at varying levels
of burnup, due to the online refueling. This non-homogeneous fuel profile makes the
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development of an accurate source term quite difficult. There are several different
approaches that could be used to simplify this problem, each with different degrees of
difficulty. The approach that was used in this model is to treat all of the fuel in the
reactor as discharge fuel. Discharge fuel has the highest concentration of fission prod-
ucts due to the high burnup. Given that many of these fission products are gamma
emitters, discharge fuel has the highest gamma flux, and thereby create the highest
dose. Treating all of the fuel as discharge fuel will lead to a higher total dose, as
compared to a mixed burnup core, and as such is a conservative estimate of the dose
that will be encountered.
The source term that was used to describe the discharge fuel was supplied by Duncan
Barber. The source term was supplied in the form of a list of isotopes and corre-
sponding activities, as calculated by an ORIGIN-S [45] simulation as part of Duncan
Barber’s Ph.D. thesis [46, 47]. In addition to the individual isotopes and activities,
the ORIGIN-S output includes a table of gamma energy release rates. These gamma
energy release rates are a combined representation of all of the gamma emissions,
accounting for different emission probabilities, from all of the present isotopes. Given
that MCNP does not deal with individual isotopes, but instead deals with gamma
emissions, this output from ORIGIN-S can be directly input into MCNP. Furthermore,
the ORIGIN-S simulation included the fuel at nine different decay times, ranging from
0.2 hours after shutdown to 240 hours after shutdown. These different decay times
will allow more versatility in the MCNP simulation, as they can be used to accu-
rately simulate how long after shutdown the inspections began. Table 3.1 shows the
gamma energy emission rates for several key decay times. Most of the simulations
were done using the 7 day decayed fuel term, as this is commonly when inspections
are started [48], however other runs were done for comparison.
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Table 3.1: Gamma Energy Emission Rates at Several Key Decay Times [46]
Emission Rate (γ/s)
Energy Bounds (MeV) 1 day 3 day 7 days 10 days
0 – 0.015 1.84E+14 1.08E+14 4.55E+13 2.82E+13
0.015 – 0.02 2.06E+13 1.39E+13 9.44E+12 7.96E+12
0.02 – 0.03 5.69E+13 3.83E+13 2.38E+13 1.87E+13
0.03 – 0.04 9.26E+13 6.66E+13 4.35E+13 3.44E+13
0.04 – 0.05 4.68E+13 2.97E+13 1.82E+13 1.47E+13
0.05 – 0.06 3.15E+13 1.99E+13 1.19E+13 9.47E+12
0.06 – 0.08 5.63E+13 3.59E+13 2.16E+13 1.73E+13
0.08 – 0.1 2.46E+14 1.61E+14 7.97E+13 5.25E+13
0.1 – 0.15 1.74E+15 1.02E+15 4.02E+14 2.33E+14
0.15 – 0.2 8.99E+13 6.06E+13 4.12E+13 3.45E+13
0.2 – 0.3 2.05E+15 1.11E+15 3.79E+14 1.84E+14
0.3 – 0.4 7.84E+14 5.53E+14 3.37E+14 2.54E+14
0.4 – 0.5 8.41E+14 7.59E+14 6.50E+14 5.83E+14
0.5 – 0.6 1.28E+15 7.84E+14 5.80E+14 5.14E+14
0.6 – 0.8 5.32E+15 3.54E+15 2.59E+15 2.30E+15
0.8 – 1.0 1.03E+15 7.70E+14 5.36E+14 4.30E+14
1.0 – 1.5 8.08E+14 3.73E+14 1.92E+14 1.34E+14
1.5 – 2.0 2.57E+15 2.30E+15 1.88E+15 1.61E+15
2.0 – 3.0 2.77E+14 2.33E+14 1.84E+14 1.56E+14
3.0 – 10 8.72E+11 7.61E+11 6.31E+11 5.41E+11
Totals 1.75E+16 1.20E+16 8.03E+15 6.61E+15
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As mentioned, these energies and emission rates can be used as an input into the
MCNP simulation. MCNP takes the energy distribution as an input, but requires a
PDF to describe the probability of each individual energy being emitted. The emis-
sion rate represents this probability, however, it needs to be normalized to 1. MCNP
can do this automatically, but it is preferable to do this in advance in order to ensure
that all probabilities are calculated properly. The normalization is done by dividing
each emission rate by the total emission rate of all energies, resulting in a fraction
between 0 and 1 for each energy range.
In addition to the energies and probabilities of emission, MCNP also requires locations
to generate the particles at. Due to the use of the repeated structure lattices in this
model, the description of source location must use these repeated structures. Several
functions were developed which describe the repeated structure path to each individual
fuel bundle. Each of these paths is given a probability that makes particle generation
from all locations equally probable. From this, each fuel bundle was described using
power laws to evenly represent the entire volume. Power laws were used in order
to evenly distribute the probability of particle generation throughout the volume.
The fuel bundles used a cylindrical volume which encompassed all of the fuel pencils.
The probability of a particle being generated at a given radius is proportional to the







This shows that the probability of radius P (r) being selected is proportional to r
and a first order power law can be used. This will distribute the probability of a
particle being generated evenly throughout the cylinder. Similarly the axial location
can be defined using a zeroth order power law. These two power laws evenly distribute
particle generation throughout the cylinder, and from there any particles that do not
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fall within a fuel pencil can be rejected, thereby evenly distributing particle generation
through the complex shape of the fuel bundle.
3.3.6.1 Activation Term
As mentioned earlier in this section, a source term describing the activation products
was developed, but due to lack of accurate data, could not be made to reliably match
benchmark data. While a fully functional activation term would be desirable, it was
determined that there were too many independent variables that could affect such a
calculation, hence introducing error. As such, an alternate method for modeling the
dose from activation products is needed, and the development of a full activation term
has been considered for future work.
The method that was chosen for modeling the activation dose was to estimate a mul-
tiplication factor for the fuel dose. Activation data was taken from known sources,
and the dose from activation was taken as a ratio to the total dose (activation and
fuel). From this factor it can be estimated what percentage of the total dose is due
to the activation product, and subsequently, what percent the fuel dose should be
increased by to yield an estimate in the total dose. In this way a total dose, including
the activation component, can be estimated without the need to actually simulate the
activation product.
In order to calculate this dose fraction, a source was needed that included both the
fuel only dose, and the activation product dose. According to [44] the dose from the
fuel only, in the centre of an empty channel should be
Ḋfuel = 4.91 kGy[Air]/hr (3.20)
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Additionally, it is stated that the dose rate from activated components is
Ḋactivation = 1.58 kGy[Air]/hr (3.21)
This activation product dose is based on a measured value from a fully defueled
reactor, six months after shutdown. While a six month shutdown term is not the
same as the scenario being simulated, this activation term is an approximation that
should provide an indication of the total dose including activation products. Using
these dose rates, the activation ratio can be found by finding the total dose rate, and
then finding the percentage of that which is from activation products, as shown by




= 24.32 % ≈ 25 % (3.23)
It is important to note that this method of estimating dose from activation products
has some limitations. Given that the activation dose is directly calculated from the
fuel dose using this approach, any locations where there is little to no fuel will result
a proportionally low dose from the activation products. This means that if a section
of the reactor were to be emptied of fuel the model would predict almost no dose,
where in reality the activation dose would still be significant. This also affects places
with large amounts of shielding, such as the end fittings. While these locations should
produce some dose from activation products, if there is low dose rates from the fuel,
the model will predict low activation dose as well. This problem will be addressed in
future work by implementing a more accurate and realistic activation term.
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3.3.7 Tallies
With the fuel defined, the entire model has been finished, however, that does not give
any way of gathering data from the model. MCNP deals with this through the use of
tallies. Tallies are effectively counts of how many of a specific event have happened.
Many tallies are some form of a flux tally, i.e., a tally that counts the flux through a
specific surface or volume. For this work f4 volume flux tallies have been exclusively
used. These tallies work by measuring the track length through the volume of interest,






where W is the track weight, TL is the track length, and V is the target volume.
The track length is the distance that the radiation traveled inside of the target vol-
ume before undergoing some sort of interaction or event. A single particle may pass
through the target volume multiple times, depending on collisions, and may even have
a collision inside of the target volume, thereby increasing the track length.







where N is the number of source particles simulated. MCNP returns all tally re-
sponses relative to the number of source particles (unit/Sp). This means that all
results are independent of the number of particles simulated. Given this, increasing
the number of particles simulated will not change the solution being calculated, but
will improve the statistics, and therefore the accuracy.
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This normalization to the number of source particles means that tallies output results
in units of γ/cm2 Sp. In order to convert these tallies into a usable flux (γ/cm
2 s)
the results must be re-normalized to the fuel emission rate. In order to do this the
tally output is multiplied by the total number of particles released per second by all
the fuel in the reactor (Sp/s), thereby resulting in a flux (γ/cm
2 s).
The tallies are all binned based on energy, meaning that when a result is measured it
is added to a specific bin based on the energy of the particle that made the track. This
binning allows for the flux measurement to be converted into air kerma, through the
use of a Dose Conversion Factor (DCF). This DCF, from International Commission
on Radiological Protection (ICRP) 119 [49], converts flux, in units of γ/cm2 s, into
kerma, with a unit of pGy[Air]/s. This is done by multiplying each energy bin by a
conversion factor with units of pGy[Air] cm2. These individual energy binned dose
rates are also summed up automatically to give a total dose rate for the tally. One
final conversion is performed in order to be able to present the results in units of
Gy[Air]/hr.
During inspection the fuel channel of interest would be emptied, removing the shield
plugs and all fuel. This gives a clear path through the entire channel, allowing for a
complete inspection. This same situation was programed into the simulation through
the use of the repeated structure lattice. An empty channel was programed and can
be placed at any location where a channel is. Following this, the fuel source term is
updated to prevent source particles being generated in this empty channel. Once the
channel is set up tallies can be prepared. Tally volumes were set up throughout the
length of the channel, each volume being 50 cm long. This allows for the dose rates
to be calculated at multiple locations axially, thereby giving a dose profile.
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The primary tally arrangement that was prepared was a non-shielded case. This setup
uses a large tally volume, almost filling the entire diameter of the pressure tube, and
as such, the tally will statistically converge faster than smaller tallies. Figure 3.15
shows the layout of this tally and the fuel channel can be seen, as outlined in Section
3.3.2 with the moderator around it. Inside of this pressure tube several black outlines
can be seen within the heavy water (green). These outlines show the borders of the
tally volume, which is 50 cm in length and 10 cm in diameter.
3.3.7.1 Shielding Cases
In addition to being able to simulate the emptied channel the model needs to be
able to simulate the improved inspection system, including any shielding it has. This
is especially important in order to determine the amount of dose that the sensitive
electronics will receive. The inspection system will include a shielded compartment
to house the most radiation sensitive components. In order to help determine po-
tential candidate materials, and the thicknesses required, this model must be able
to test different materials. With this in mind, a number of tally arrangements were
set up, with different thicknesses of shielding. Shielding thicknesses have been set
up from 0 cm to 3.0 cm in order to find a sufficient thickness. 3.0 cm was chosen as
the maximum thickness because any more shielding than this would not leave suffi-
cient space for the electronics. This variable shield thickness can be simulated as any
material, however, for this thesis three candidate materials for the inspection system
have been used. These materials are: steel (SS304L), tungsten, and depleted uranium.
The shielding cases all use the same tally volume in order to ensure comparable results.
This tally volume is a cylinder that is 50 cm long, and 3 cm in diameter, and uses air
as the tally material. This tally volume also has air around it, up to the shield. This is
done to keep consistency between the different shielding cases, because the shield will
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likely be filled with air. Figure 3.16 shows the shielding case for 0 cm of shielding and
Figure 3.17 shows the case for 2 cm of shielding. In both of these cases the pressure
tube assembly, as described in Section 3.3.2, can be seen with the moderator around
it, and inside of the pressure tube is the shielding. The air (red) that makes up the
tally volume is within the black outlines, and surrounded by the shield fill, also air.
In Figure 3.17 the shield material, steel in this case (yellow), can then be seen around
the air fill. It is worth noting that there is a small amount of heavy water coolant
(green) around the shield, or the air in the 0 cm case. This water is left because one
of the requirement of the robotic system is a minimum 10 cm2 bypass flow area.
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Figure 3.15: Non-Shielded Tally Arrangement
Figure 3.16: Shielded Tally Arrangement with 0 cm Shielding
Figure 3.17: Shielded Tally Arrangement with 2 cm Shielding
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Chapter 4
Graphical User Interface (GUI)
MCNP is a specialized program, with a primitive input structure based upon operat-
ing system command line architecture. Given this, it often requires a specially trained
person to modify, or even to run, simulations through MCNP. The end goal of this
work is to generate a simulation that can predict the dose rates in the reactor, for use
with an improved robotic inspection system. With this in mind, it would be beneficial
if the MCNP simulation could be adjusted to a new set of inspection parameters and
run, without the need of a specially trained MCNP user. With this in mind, a GUI
has been developed with a non-MCNP user in mind. This GUI will allow the user
to develop and run a MCNP input deck for almost any potential inspection environ-
ments, without requiring them to interact directly with the MCNP inputs. While
this GUI has been developed with ease of use in mind and so that a specially trained
MCNP expert is not needed, the user will still require training on the use of this GUI
to ensure that the inputs and results are reasonable.
The GUI, which is shown in Figure 4.1, uses buttons and drop down menus to allow the
user to select values for a number of variables. These selections are then interpreted























then all arranged into an overarching folder architecture which MCNP can handle,
and several auxiliary files are written. This chapter will explain the various functions
of the GUI and the files, along with the file architecture that the GUI creates.
4.1 Channel Selection
The first, and arguably most important, feature of the GUI is the ability to select
which channel, or channels, to empty and generate results in. This selection of chan-
nels can be done in one of two ways: either through a set of buttons arranged in the
channel layout, as shown on the right side of Figure 4.1; or by entering the alpha
numeric location of the channel into the channel select box, as shown in Figure 4.2.
When a channel is selected by clicking the appropriate button in the reactor layout
the corresponding alpha numeric location1 will also be added to the channel select
box. Similarly, if an alpha numeric location is entered into channel select box, and
the select channels button is pressed, it will also be marked as empty in the reactor
layout. In this way, both systems can be used in conjunction, or independently, de-
pending on which is easier for the individual user.
This channel selection mechanism allows for the user to plan the specific channels
which will be emptied and inspected, thereby allowing for predictions of the dose
rates and total dose that the inspection system will encounter. This is very important
due to the connection between the individual channel doses, and the location, and
number of surrounding channels that are also empty, given that the primary source
of dose is from the irradiated fuel in the surrounding channels.
1The alpha numeric locations are labeled with the row being referred by letter, A through Y
omitting I, and the columns being referred to by number, 1 through 24
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Figure 4.2: Closeup of Channel Select Box
Channels that are selected to be emptied in this method have several changes made to
them within the MCNP code. The first change is that the geometries for the fuel and
shield plug are both removed. Additionally, the D2O coolant that filled the space is
modified. With the channel now clear, a number of tally volumes are entered. These
tallies will be discussed in the following section.
4.2 Tally Location
As mentioned in the previous section, during the process of selecting the channels to
be emptied and inspected, space is cleared for the tally volumes. These tally volumes
take up almost the entire space within the fuel channel, and are generated for the full
length regardless of the tally locations selected. There are a total of 23 separate tally
volumes, each 50 cm long, which make up the full length. While the tally volumes
are generated for the full length, they simply act as whatever material they are made
of (determined by the shielding case). The tallying capability, which allows them to
generate results, is not implemented on any individual location until the tally volumes
are selected as active.
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Figure 4.3: Closeup of Tally Selection Interface
The GUI also takes care of selecting which tallies to use through the tally selection
interface, as shown in Figure 4.3. This interface allows the user to select where they
would like results to be generated at. The locations can be selected individually, by
clicking on the corresponding button on the interface, or the locations can be selected
in a batch by using the drop down menu. Additionally, there are tool tips, bubbles
that pop up when the user hovers over one of the tally location buttons, that will
display the centre point of the tally, in centimeters from core centre.
The tallies that have been selected are entered into the MCNP input deck, and results
are generated at these locations. Any number of tallies, up to the total number of
tallies present, may be selected at the same time, provided that at least one tally
is selected, otherwise an error message will pop up asking the user to correct this.
The tallies that are selected are applied to each channel that has been selected for
inspection. It is not currently possible for the user to select different tally layouts for
different channels, however, this functionality could be added in at a later time.
4.3 Fuel Composition
The next function to be discussed is the fuel selection menu. This drop down menu
allows the user to select fuel composition, by selecting the number of days since the
reactor shut down. This cooling period can make a very large difference to the activity
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Table 4.1: Total Fuel Activity for Different Fuel Terms





of the fuel, and as such can make a large difference to the dose rates that the inspection
system is going to experience. There are currently four different fuel terms that the
GUI can use, as shown in Table 4.1, and additional fuel terms could be added for
improved accuracy. Table 4.1 shows the total activity for a single bundle of fuel.
4.4 Shielding Case
In addition to being able to select the channel to inspect and the location for the
tallies, the user is also able to select the shielding case to simulate. As discussed in
Section 3.3.7.1, the shielding cases are used to simulate the shielding on the inspec-
tion system. There are two main variables that can be changed for the shielding case:
the thickness/layout of the shielding and the material. The shielding case is selected
through the use of a drop down menu and an accompanying image. The menu allows
for the selection and the image shows how the selected shielding arrangement will be
implemented. If a shielding case with a shield is selected, the material selection drop
down menu becomes available. This material menu allows for the user to select the
material that will be used in the shield. Currently only three materials options are
available: SS 304L, Tungsten, and Depleted Uranium, however, further options could
be added as needed. Once a material is selected, the density of the selected material
will be displayed below the selection menu. Figure 4.4 shows the full shielding case
selection interface, including the material selection menu.
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Figure 4.4: Closeup of Shielding Case Selection Interface
There are currently seven options for shielding case, as discussed in Section 3.3.7,
which include a non-shielded case and shielded cases ranging from 0 cm to 3 cm in
shield thickness, at 0.5 cm intervals. All of the shielded cases (not the non shielded
case) use the same tally volume to allow for accurate comparisons between cases.
4.5 Other Features
In addition to the four main functions of the GUI, there are also several secondary
functionalities that have been implemented. These functionalities include the ability
to select the number of particles to be simulated, automatic and manual selection of
the number of computer threads to use, and the ability to run the MCNP simulation
from the GUI.
4.5.1 Number of Particles
At the bottom left corner of the GUI interface, as seen in Figure 4.1, is the selection
interface for the number of particles. This allows users to enter the number of par-
ticles, in scientific notation, that they would like MCNP to run. This value changes
how long the run will take, but also changes the statistical error of the simulation.
The default value of 1e9 particles has been found to be an adequate number of par-
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ticles for simulating channels without shielding to achieve acceptable statistics. On
shielding cases, it is recommended that users run the simulation at 1e9 to generate
rough estimates and the associated error, and then increase the number of particles
simulated, in order to decrease the error.
4.5.2 Number of Threads
Next to the number of particles input is the number of threads menu. This menu
allows the user to run the simulation using more than one thread (virtual core). By
increasing the number of threads with which to run MCNP, the speed of the simu-
lation can be increased. The number of threads used simply tells MCNP how many
of the computers logical cores to task, and, as such, can increase the speed of the
simulation without affecting the results.
The drop down menu allows users to select a number of threads between one and the
maximum number of the computer. If the user selects the maximum number of threads
available a warning will pop up alerting the user that this may lead to unexpected
issues with the computer and asking if they want to continue. This warning appears
because MCNP fully tasks as many threads as it has access to, and, as such, the
computer can respond slowly to other commands. The maximum number of threads
available is detected by the GUI upon running it, by interfacing with constant, pre-
defined Microsoft Windows environment variables. Additionally, the value for number
of threads to use is set to one less than the maximum number by default, in order to
maximize speed of simulation without overworking the computer.
4.5.3 Run MCNP
Once the user has selected all of the channels they wish to inspect, the tally locations
to generate results at, the shielding case and material, the fuel composition, the
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number of particles, and the number of threads with which to run the simulation on,
they need to be able to generate an MCNP input deck. This is done by clicking the
“Generate Input” button in the lower centre of the GUI. If the user has failed to
correctly select something, such as not selecting a channel or tally, an error message
will appear notifying them of this. If no errors are present, the necessary input deck
is generated at a predefined location, as discussed in Section 4.6.1 below, and the
“Run” button appears next to it. This run button will run the simulation using the
input that was just generated.
4.6 Auxiliary Files
The GUI serves the purpose of allowing the user to interact with the MCNP files
through a graphical interface. In order to allow the GUI to change parts of the
MCNP input, without changing the entire file, a segmented input file was used. This
allows for one main file to contain READ commands which point to the other necessary
files. Additionally, the input files that are being read do not need to be in the same
folder and the main file, and can be split into a neat file architecture which is easier
to navigate if needed. In addition to the inputs being organized into a neat file
architecture, several additional files are also generated including batch files, parsing
scripts and output files. The file architecture and additional files are discussed in
greater detail in the following section.
4.6.1 File Architecture
As mentioned above, a specific file architecture has been implemented to ensure that
all MCNP files are in predictable locations. The GUI generates a complete file archi-
tecture, however, this would not be of any use if the location on the computer could
not also be set. Given this, the GUI uses the %homedrive% and %homepath% Windows
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environment variables in order to locate a suitable location to generate results in.
When combined as %homedrive%%homepath%, these variables direct to the folder di-
rectory for the current user, as set up in Windows (e.g., C:\Users\Jordan Gilbert\).
This will work regardless of the username and default drive. From here My Documents
can be accessed, and it is here that the GUI generates all files.
The first step is to generate a new folder within the My Documents folder, called DNGS
Results, where all further files can be generated. Within the DNGS Results folder
everything is divided between Input and Output. Figure 4.5 shows the full folder
architecture and the files within each folder. The input folder contains a folder which
holds the part files, the main input files (DNGSCoreDose#.txt) and the MCNPRun.bat
file. The part files are broken up into sub folders, which each hold a number of differ-
ent text files, each describing a piece of the MCNP input. There are five main input
files, each named sequentially, 1-5. These main files are identical with the exception
that they each have a different random number seed. Finally, the batch file is made
to set up the temporary environment variables that MCNP needs to run, and then
calls MCNP five times, once for each of the five main files. This also tells MCNP to
name all of its output files output#, where the # corresponds to the input file.
The output folder contains several types of files: the parser, the output files, and
the parsed output files. There are two MCNP output files: output files (output#.o)
which contain the results of the MCNP simulation and runtape files (output#.r)
which contain records of the simulation as it runs, in case a run is interrupted. As
discussed above, the # refers to the corresponding input number. The runtape files
are not overly useful once the simulation is complete and as such are not used. The
output files, however, have a great deal of information contained within. They can be
very confusing to read and sometimes it is beneficial to be able to separate the results
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of interest from the rest of the information. The parser serves this purpose by reading
through the MCNP output files and taking the dose results and Tally Fluctuation
Charts (TFCs) and storing them in Comma Separated Value (CSV) files for easy use
with Microsoft Excel, or other similar programs. There is one dose CSV file and one
TFC CSV file for each input file (1-5).
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Building the model and ensuring its accuracy was an iterative process. Given that
the purpose of this model is to accurately predict dose to inspection systems within
the reactor, the first, and possibly most important, result that needs to be exam-
ined is benchmarking. Once the model was benchmarked, and the accuracy of the
dose predictions had been shown, results were generated for different configurations
of shielding on the robotic inspection system. Based on the results, estimations of
component lifetimes could be determined. This chapter will go through the different
tests performed and explain both the scenario tested and results found.
5.1 Benchmarking
As mentioned, benchmarking the model against existing values was key in ensuring
the accuracy and reliability of this tool. Proper benchmark values were extremely
difficult to obtain, as the majority of measurements from within the core are either
proprietary knowledge, or are neutron measurements from reactor operation. While
data about the dose rates within an offline reactor is sparse, some benchmarking data
points were found.
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The first benchmarking data point that was found is from OPG documentation,
specifically the design requirements for the current CIGAR system [15]. The require-
ment states the the system must be able to survive in radiation fields of 1× 106 R/hr
(8.77 kGy[Air]/hr) [15]. This value is a operational limit, meaning that if an inspec-
tion system can withstand this dose rate it will be able to survive in the reactor. For
this reason it is expected that the dose rates predicted by the model should be below
this operational limit. While this is not a true benchmark value it does still provide
an upper bound that the simulation results can be compared against.
In an attempt to further verify the accuracy of the dose estimates generated by the
simulation, further benchmarking values were sought out. As mentioned above, this
proved to be difficult and only one other value was found. This second benchmarking
value comes from work done by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) [44]. As
part of a project to locate garter springs using spectroscopy, computer modeling of the
offline reactor was performed. This model was not a complete reactor model as was
developed for this thesis, but was instead a single lattice cell with reflective boundary
conditions. The dose rate that was reported in the centre of an empty channel, 7 days
after shutdown, was 560 kR/hr (4.91 kGy[Air]/hr) [44]. In addition to a benchmark
value for the dose rate from fuel, a benchmark value for the activation term was also
included in the paper. The dose rate from only the activation products was 180 kR/hr
(1.58 kGy[Air]/hr) [44].
In order to generate a value which could be benchmarked against the two reference
values found, a comparable simulation setup was prepared. The simulation was run
with channel M13, one of the centre channels, emptied, and using a 7 day decayed
fuel term. Tallies were set at all locations within the core (−275 cm to 275 cm), and
the results were averaged to find the in-core dose rates. The simulation was run and
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Fuel Only 4.49 4.91 [44] 9.16
Activation Only1 1.12 1.58 [44] 29.1
Total (AECL) 5.61 6.49 [44] 14.0
Total (OPG) 5.61 8.77 [15] 30.0
1Note that this activation dose rate was calculated from the ratio
of the activation dose rate to the total dose rate from the AECL
paper, as explained in Section 3.3.6.1.
an estimated dose rate of 4.46 kGy[Air]/hr was found for the fuel alone. With the
additional 25% increase to account for the activation term, the total dose rate esti-
mate was 5.58 kGy[Air]/hr. These dose rates are presented in Table 5.1 alongside the
benchmarking values.
Given that the source term used for this simulation is based upon discharge fuel, it
was expected that the resulting dose estimations should be slightly higher than the
benchmark values, where the burnup would be mixed. With this is mind it is key to
note that the percent difference shown in Table 5.1 is likely an underestimate of the
actual error. Additionally, the activation dose for the simulation is estimated using
a multiplication factor, that was calculated based on the activation dose rates from
the AECL paper [44], as described in Section 3.3.6.1. This means that comparing
the activation dose rates is only a rough approximation. Even with these errors in
mind, it can still be seen that the estimated dose values are reasonably close to the
benchmarking values, especially when the uncertainty of the benchmarking values is
considered. This benchmarking shows that the simulation estimates the dose rates
present sufficiently well, such that the estimates can be used to predict component
lifetime for the improved inspection system.
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Table 5.2: Sensitivity of Dose to Bundle Power





In the development of the model and the simulation a number of small simplifications
were made. These simplifications, combined with the uncertainty in some of the
input parameters, could result in an error in the calculated results. This error is
almost impossible to quantify due to the number of uncertainties and errors that are
combined within the model. To ensure that the results being presented are reliable,
a sensitivity analysis has been performed. In this sensitivity analysis the fuel source
term was modified in order to determine the sensitivity of the dose to the bundle
power used for the source term. The bundle power was varied by ±10% and a new
source term was developed. This source term was then used as an input to the model
and a new set of simulations was run. The results of these simulations can be found in
Table 5.2. It can be seen that a 10% change in the fuel bundle power will also result
in approximately 10% change in the dose rate. This shows that the model responds
in a predictable and reliable manner.
5.3 Days After Shutdown
With the benchmarking confirming that the dose rates predicted at 7 days after shut-
down, it was reasonable to extend this to other decay times. Four times were selected
for testing at this time, with more able to be added reasonably simply as future work.
Table 5.3 shows the estimated in-core dose rates at the four testing times. Addition-
ally, Figure 5.1 shows the trend of the dose rate, as well as the total fuel activity
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present within the reactor. It is clear that both the fuel activity and the dose rate
decrease in an exponential trend, however the activity falls off much quicker, relative
to the dose rate.
By being able to estimate the dose rates present within the reactor at different times
after shutdown, an ideal inspection schedule can be predicted. This ideal inspection
schedule would depend on the locations within the reactor, the hardness of the final
electronics selected, and the amount of shielding selected. By varying these, and other
variables, the delay between reactor shutdown and inspection start can be minimized,
without fear of the electronics failing unexpectedly. Minimizing the delay between
shutdown and inspection will allow the inspections to be completed faster, which
would in turn reduce the required downtime. Reductions to downtime are always
highly valued due to the large cost associated with reactor shutdown.
5.4 Axial Distribution
The dose rate within the reactor is not uniform throughout, certain areas where there
are large amounts of shielding have lower dose rates from the fuel. Figure 5.2 shows
the dose rate along the fuel channel, including in the end fitting. The dose rates shown
do not include those from activation. This is especially important at either end of the
reactor, in the end fittings, where the shield wall blocks the majority of the dose from
the fuel. In these areas, the activation term will be more important, however, the
current method of estimating activation dose is not deemed appropriate to use here,
and as such the results for the end fittings are unreliable. The vertical lines labeled
as shield wall show the approximate start of the shield walls. The tally volumes at
±300 cm from reactor centre are half in the end fitting and half in the core, thus
the vastly reduced dose relative to the core dose. It is worth noting that even with
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Table 5.3: Estimated Dose Rates at Different Days After Shutdown
Estimated Dose Rate (kGy[Air]/hr)





Figure 5.1: Estimated Dose Rate and Total Fuel Activity vs. Days Since Shutdown
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Figure 5.2: Axail Distribution of Dose Rate from Fuel Along Channel M13
some dose caused by activation, the end fittings have extremely low dose rates. This
makes these locations ideal for placement of components that are more susceptible
to failure as a result of exposure to radiation. Future work on the inspection system
should look at the possibility of moving the sensitive computer components off of the
inspection head, and back to the end fitting, where it will survive much longer. It
is also important to note that the dose rates within the core bounds are very stable,
this makes estimating total dose easier, as the entire core residence time will be at
the same dose rate.
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5.5 Shielding Cases
As discussed in Sections 3.3.7 and 4.4, a number of shielding configurations have been
implemented into the simulation to represent the shielding that will be present on the
inspection system. These shielding cases allow for the simulation to predict the dose
to the key components and to allow different shielding configurations to be tested
in order to find the optimal solution. Tests were done for three different shielding
materials, at six different thicknesses ranging from 0.0 cm to 3.0 cm with 0.5 cm steps.
The materials that were tested were stainless steel (SS304L), tungsten, and depleted
uranium. Figure 5.3 shows the estimated dose rates inside of the three different mate-
rial shields, and the trends that develop with thicker shields. It is worth noting that
the dose rate for 0 cm of shielding is the same run, as there is no material present.
The 0 cm run was included because the shielding case requires a smaller tally volume
than a non-shielded case, and this smaller tally volume results in different statistical
variation. In order to keep all shielded runs comparable the tally volume that was
used is that of the 3 cm run, which has the smallest diameter. With all of the shielding
runs, including a non-shielded case, run with this small tally volume, all of the results
will be comparable and any change will be due to the addition of shielding material.
One issue that has been noted at higher shielding thicknesses is an increase in the
statistical error predicted by MCNP. This is because MCNP uses large numbers of
result samples to form a final estimate and the fewer point that can be sample the
higher the statistical error. As the shielding increases the number of particles that
make it through the shield decreases, and therefor the statistical error increases. This
can be overcome by increasing the number of particles used or by implementing a bias
to focus the calculations on the areas of interest.
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Figure 5.3: Dose Rates for Various Shielding Materials
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5.6 Estimated Component Lifetime
Each of these tested variables, time after shutdown, location within the reactor, and
shielding, can be combined in order to generate a model that exactly describes the
state of the reactor when inspections are planned. This estimation of the dose rates
for the exact inspection environment is vital in estimating the lifetime of the inspec-
tion system. Components for the inspection system can be broken into two categories:
unshielded and shielded components. Some components, such as the ultrasonic sen-
sors, drive mechanisms, and resolvers cannot be shielded as they need to be in direct
contact (line of sight for the ultrasonics) with the pressure tube. For these compo-
nents, the lifetime is estimated using unshielded runs. Shielded components, such as
the microprocessor and computer components, are much more radiosensitive, and as
such will be shielded to increase their lifetime. These components will have lifetimes
generated for multiple shielding cases and the best case will be selected. Table 5.4,
duplicated here from Section 2.3.3, shows a list of the radiation hardnesses of some
key components.
Table 5.4: Radiation Hardness of Various Robotic Components
Type Component Total Dose
Computing
Integrated Circuit (CMOS) [33] 10 kGy[Si]
Microprocessor [33] 3 kGy[Si]
RAM [33] 10 kGy[Si]
A/D Converter [33] 10 kGy[Si]
Bus Interface [33] 3 kGy[Si]
SERializer/DESerializer [33] 10 kGy[Si]
Location
Sensors
Optical Encoder (Standard) [34] 1 kGy
Optical Encoder (Hardened) [34] 1 MGy
Optical Encoder (Fibre) [34] 10 MGy
Resolver [34] 10 MGy
Potentiometer [34] 10 MGy
Sensors
Ultrasonic Sensor [34] 10 MGy
Distance Sensor [35] 20 MGy
Other
Components
Conductors/Connectors [35] 10 MGy
Drive Mechanisms [35] 10 MGy
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5.6.1 Dose Comparison
Before the simulated doses can be compared to the component hardnesses it must be
ensured that the doses are in the same units. The simulation and benchmarking values
are all in units of Gy[Air], meaning Gy in air, and as such can clearly be compared.
The robotic components on the other hand have their hardness values measured in
Gy[Si]. Some of the components do not state what material the dose is measured
in so it is assumed to be silicon, as this is standard for electronics. To convert the





WhereD is the dose in the material and µen(material)/ρ is the mass energy absorption
coefficient for the respective material. It can be seen that the ratio of the mass energy
absorption coefficients acts as a factor by which the dose can be multiplied in order
to convert it. The mass energy absorption coefficients are energy dependant so an
averaged ratio was developed as shown in Table 5.5. It can be seen that the averaged
mass energy absorption coefficient is only 1.08 and as such it is reasonable to directly
compare doses in air to doses in silicon without the need for conversion.
5.6.2 Unshielded Components
As can be clearly seen in Table 5.4, the unshielded components are generally much
more radiation resistant than the computing components. The ultrasonic sensors,
resolvers, potentiometer, electrical conductors and drive mechanisms are all able to
survive total doses of 10 MGy. Table 5.6 shows the dose rates, as discussed above,
and the time to failure for these components. It is clear to see that the unshielded
components can withstand the radiation environment for sufficient time to complete
multiple inspections.
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Table 5.5: Average Mass Energy Absorption Coefficient Calculations
Energy µen(Air)/ρ [24] µen(Si)/ρ [24] Ratio
0.1 0.0233 0.0435 1.87
0.15 0.0251 0.0300 1.20
0.2 0.0268 0.0286 1.07
0.3 0.0288 0.0291 1.01
0.4 0.0296 0.0293 0.99
0.5 0.0296 0.0290 0.98
0.6 0.0296 0.0290 0.98
0.8 0.0289 0.0282 0.98
1 0.0280 0.0274 0.98
1.25 0.0268 0.0263 0.98
1.5 0.0256 0.0252 0.98
2 0.0238 0.0236 0.99
3 0.0211 0.0217 1.03
Average Ratio 1.08









1 8.38 119 19.8
3 7.31 137 22.8
7 5.61 178 29.7
10 4.74 217 36.2
1Failure time assumed to be when total dose of 10 MGy reached.
2Assuming 6 hours in core per channel visit.
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5.6.3 Shielded Components
In addition to the components discussed above, that do not require shielding, there
are a number of more radiosensitive components. These components will mostly be
integrated circuits and microprocessors that will be used to control the motors and in-
terpret information from the various sensors. Specific parts have not yet been sourced
for the improved inspection system, and as a result the exact radiation hardness is
not known. Radiation hardened components have been found and are being used
as a baseline for calculating lifetimes. These lifetimes can be updated once specific
components are selected.
Based on the radiation hardness of the baseline electronics, as shown in Table 5.4, it
can clearly be seen that the microprocessor and bus interface will be the most radiosen-
sitive component. Using the total dose acceptable for these components (3 kGy[Si]) as
the failure dose of the system, it is possible to estimate the lifetime. A series of runs
were done at 7 days after shutdown, testing each shielding material and thickness as
outlined in Section 3.3.7.1 and the results are shown in Table 5.7.
Given that inspections currently take a total of approximately 12 hours to com-
plete [48], including placement of the inspection system into the pressure tube and
preparation to inspect, this means that the inspection head should only be in the
reactor core for approximately 6 hours. With this in mind, any shield that does
not provide a lifetime of at least 6 hours will not be acceptable. This immediately
eliminates any shield made of steel or lead, and any thickness below 2.0 cm for both
tungsten and depleted uranium. Tungsten could be used at 2.5 to 3.0 cm of thickness
and depleted uranium could be used at thicknesses above 2.0 cm. With that being
said however, most of these materials have additional factors that should be taken
into consideration before selecting a shield. Depleted uranium could be activated,
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potentially forming plutonium, which would have a number of drawbacks. Tungsten
can lead to the generation of x-rays, potentially increasing the dose to the electronics.
Lead has a mechanical issue, in that it is soft and therefore would require a structural
shell to prevent pieces of the shield being scrapped off and left within the reactor.
Further consideration will be required before a shield selection can be finalized.
Table 5.7: Estimated Failure Time for Shielded Components
Estimated Failure Times1 (hr)
Thickness Steel Lead Tungsten DU
0.0 cm 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
0.5 cm 0.54 0.78 0.95 1.12
1.0 cm 0.65 1.14 1.63 2.05
1.5 cm 0.78 1.59 2.67 3.58
2.0 cm 0.92 2.18 4.36 6.15
2.5 cm 1.12 3.00 7.27 10.43
3.0 cm 1.35 4.21 12.00 17.14





This thesis has examined the development of an MCNP model for predicting the dose
rates to an improved robotic inspection system, and the lifetime of the components
within such does rates. A background of the CANDU reactor and inspection systems
was presented and the potential radiation effects and damage mechanisms that could
affect the inspection systems were explained. In addition to the radiation damage
mechanisms, a list of key components and their radiation tolerances was presented.
Following this, the Monte Carlo method was explained and the MCNP model was
described in detail. Additionally, the GUI, which was developed to interface with
the MCNP model, was presented, including an in-depth explanation of the various
functions that it can perform.
The model was then benchmarked against values from both OPG and AECL, showing
good agreement with both (within 14% difference compared to the AECL benchmark).
Several other tests were also described, showing the estimated dose rates for several
different scenarios including: different days since shutdown, different axial locations
within the reactor, and different shielding cases. Following this, the component life-
times were estimated using the radiation tolerance and the estimated dose rates. It
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was found that most components would be able to withstand well over 100 hr in chan-
nel without the need for shielding, but certain components such as the microprocessor,
would only last for a limited time, even with large amounts of shielding. If these com-
ponents needed to be on the inspection head they could be shielded with tungsten
of thicknesses in excess of 2.5 cm, which would allow them to survive for one or two
inspections. Alternatively, if the components did not need to be on the inspection
head, they could be moved into the end fitting where the reactor shielding will re-
duce the dose rate enough to allow the components to be used for multiple inspections.
The MCNP simulation and accompanying GUI form a tool that allows for dose fields
to be predicted throughout the reactor. Until now there has not been any such tool,
or even static dose field data. The availability of accurate input data, such a source
terms, and appropriate benchmarking values has hampered the development of the
simulation, however, the completed simulation has been shown to predict the radiation
fields within acceptable deviation from the benchmarking values that were found.
While this simulation was developed around the Darlington reactor, the modular
approach taken in its development would allow it to be easily modified to simulate
any CANDU reactor.
6.1 Future Work
This simulation and the GUI that accompanies it have been shown to be a sufficiently
accurate tool for the purpose of predicting dose rates within the reactor. That being
said, there are still a number of ways that they could be improved. The first major
improvement that could be added is an improved activation term. As discussed in
Section 3.3.6.1, the activation term that is being used is an approximation and as
such leaves room for further development. A separate simulation could be performed
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to develop an explicit activation source term, which would include the location and
isotopic activity of any activation products. This activation source term could then
be implemented as an input to the overall radiation field model and would improve
the accuracy of the dose predictions.
In addition to a proper activation term, further benchmarking is required to ensure the
complete accuracy of the predicted doses. Ideally this benchmark would be against a
measured value from a reactor. This benchmarking is especially important for the end
fittings, where a large portion of the inspection systems will be housed, but cannot
be accurately modeled yet. Further improvements to the fuel source term are also
possible. The current model uses discharge fuel as a source term, which should result
in higher dose rates as compared to a mixed burnup fuel term.
Beyond these more important improvements, there are a number of less important
changes that could be made to further improve accuracy. The current model focuses
purely on photons, however, photons will lead to the development of beta particles.
These more complex phenomenon would likely cause the simulation to be significantly
slower and as such may be best implemented as a separate simulation on a single
channel basis. In addition to the changes to the MCNP simulation, there are also
some improvements that can be made to the GUI. These improvements would include
determining recommended run times for different simulations, thereby ensuring the
statistical error is sufficiently low. Additionally, improved output processing would
allow the user to view data from the simulation in a more manageable manner. Finally,
more information is needed for the radiation hardness of the specific components that
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Table A.1: OPG Technical Drawings Used [41]
Drawing Title Drawing Number
End Fitting Assy. NK38-GEN-31120-0001-001
Fuel Channel End Fitting Finished
Machined Body Detail
NK38-DFN-31120-0002-001
Fuel Channel Assemblies Major Assembly
Installation Requirements
NK38-GEN-31100-0003-A01
Fuel Channel Assembly Internal End
Fitting Components Control Dimensions
NK38-GEK-31100-0009
Fuel Channel Assembly Internal End
Fitting Components Assembly
NK38-GEK-31100-0006






The source term that describes the activation products within an offline CANDU
reactor is very complicated. Every component within the reactor core will become
activated over the reactor operation, and therefore produce radiation. The degree
of activation is a function of the total operation time of the reactor, the location
of the component being activated, and of the the material that is being activated.
Given this, it is very difficult to generate an accurate activation source term. One
method to get around these issues would be to generate the activation source term
for end of reactor lifetime, right after shutdown. This would result in the highest ac-
tivity for the activated components, therefor resulting in a conservative dose estimate.
The other issue that arises is the location to generate the source term in within the
model. Every component within the reactor will be activate, some more than others,
and there is limits on how many source locations can be defined. This becomes even
more complicated in cases where a repeated geometry is used, such as in this model.
In order to get around this, certain activation components need to be ignored and
others need to be combined.
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An activation term was generated for the current model in an attempt to accurately
predict the dose rates caused by the activation products, however a lack of accurate
and reliable input data resulted in the failure of this attempt. As discussed in Section
6.1, there are several ways to improve the activation source term, however these are
future work.
For the activation term that was generated, the source term used was based on a
decommissioning activation term as found in [50]. This paper used MCNP and ORI-
GEN2 in order to develop activity amounts in each separate component. Unfortu-
nately, this work was for a CANDU 6, which has different dimensions, and only has
380 channels. This discrepancy was accounted for by using the ratio of channels to
proportionally increase the activities. While this source term was not ideal, it was
the best one that could be found and as such was used.
The location of the source term also proved difficult. As mentioned earlier in this sec-
tion there are limits on the number of source locations that can be used. The source
locations that were used for this attempt can be broken down into four categories:
the pressure/calandria tubes; the SSC, such as the shield wall, end fitting, and shield
plugs; the reactivity devices; and the calandria tank.
The calandria and pressure tubes were the first to be added as they are directly beside
both the fuel and the location of interest. In order to reduce the number of separate
source locations needed the calandria tube source term was merged into the pressure
tube source term. This should have little effect on the results, as the difference in
shielding will be minuscule.
The SSC were the next location that was developed. The SSCs are the components
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around either side of the reactor, such as the end fitting assembly and the shield wall.
The shield plugs and liner tubes within the end fittings were modified in order to
make them all the same cell as the end fitting. Given that the material for all of
these components is the same it will not affect the results. It does however allow the
entire area to be defined as a single location. The shield wall could then be defined
separately, as it uses different materials.
The reactivity devices, or control mechanisms, were the next, and most difficult, ac-
tivation product location added. The control mechanisms were not included in the
initial model of the core due to the small effect they should have on a gamma shielding
case. They are however very important when it comes to neutron shielding, and as
such they can be very highly activated. Additionally, the reactivity devices do not
appear in a pattern that lends itself to being modeled through repeated structures.
This was avoided by adding several, semi-circular, vertical extrusions to the modera-
tor volume between the channels, on either side of the lattice cell. These extrusions
lined up with the next lattice to form vertical cylinders. the cylinders were placed in
locations that should average the true locations of the reactivity devices, but with-
out requiring separate structures. These cylinders were made of heavy water, as the
amount of actual metal present should not provide a large amount of shielding. This
was only meant to be a temporary placeholder, and further work would be required
to properly model this complex system. While this was a rudimentary approach it
did provide appropriate locations to place the activation term.
The final component that needed an activation term was the calandria tank around the
outside, however it was very straightforward to implement. Unfortunately, even with
all of the component locations and the source term, the results were extremely low,
and did not match benchmark values. Given that more accurate input information
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was not readily accessible, and that time was short, this work was determined to not
be worth pursuing for this thesis, and as such would be marked as future work
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